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MOVE OR IMPROVE?  
PLACE, POLICY, AND EDUCATOR LABOR MARKETS  
 
What is the role of place and policy in shaping educator labor markets during the 
decade following the Great Recession of 2008? This research leverages data on Kentucky 
students, educators, schools, and school districts from 2009 to 2018, with a focus on the 
rural, isolated Appalachian region. Many counties in the region have long struggled with 
poverty, low rates of labor force participation, lower educational attainment, and 
dependence on public transfers (Ziliak, 2019). Despite these challenges, the people of 
Appalachia demonstrate a strong attachment to the region. With this research, I enhance 
understanding of contexts and conditions, such as unique aspects of the Appalachian 
educator labor market, that could inform statewide or place-based policy design and 
implementation. I strengthen knowledge of patterns and trends in staffing to inform 
future research about causal effects of policy, and mechanisms driving those effects, in 
Appalachia, rural areas, and beyond. Finally, I contribute conceptual frameworks to 
describe relationships between school accountability and educator labor markets. I use a 
discrete time duration model to estimate relationships between teacher, district, policy, 
and place factors on teacher attrition and cross-district mobility. I contribute descriptive 
analyses to enhance understanding of staffing and educator career pathways. The 
analyses include trends over time and patterns across district types, including 
Appalachian and rural districts.  Finally, I employ a regression discontinuity model, 
finding causal effects of a “report card” aspect of Kentucky’s school accountability 
system on student achievement, academic growth, and principal turnover.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation  
With this dissertation research, I seek to enhance understanding of the role of place 
and policy in educator labor markets during the decade following the Great Recession of 
2008. This research leverages data on Kentucky students, educators, schools, and school 
districts from 2009 to 2018, with a focus on the rural, isolated Appalachian region. Many 
counties in the region have long struggled with poverty, low rates of labor force 
participation, lower educational attainment, and dependence on public transfers (Ziliak, 
2019). Cycles of prosperity and austerity from the coal mining industry have affected 
incomes and migration to regions with better economic opportunities (Eller, 2008). 
Despite these challenges, the people of Appalachia demonstrate a strong attachment to 
the region, a distinct place formed by shared history and a strong culture.  
Although research literature has recognized the role of geographic proximity in 
education labor markets (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005), evidence from initial 
placement of teachers and teacher mobility and attrition during the 1986-2005 time-
period suggests a deeper role of place in shaping the Appalachian teacher labor market 
(Cowen, Butler, Fowles, Streams, & Toma, 2012; Fowles, Butler, Cowen, Streams, & 
Toma, 2013). With a narrow range of occupational alternatives, college-educated 
Appalachians who prefer to stay in the region may be likely to choose a career as a 
certified educator in public schools (Streams, Kukla-Acevedo, Robinson, & Toma, 2013). 
A career in education may also appeal to those who want to stay in the Appalachian 
region as well as make a contribution to improve their communities. Chetty, Friedman, 
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and Rockoff (2014), for example, find that elementary teachers with high impacts on 
their students’ academic growth have positive effects on their students’ college 
attendance and future earnings – finding education a promising avenue through which to 
improve economic mobility at the level of place. 
In the wake of the Great Recession, Kentucky joined many other states in enacting 
statewide policy changes intended to improve educational quality and attainment. 
Spurred in part by federal policy incentives in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (ARRA), these changes included standards-based education reforms as well 
as human capital reforms – both implemented statewide. Meanwhile, Congress 
appropriated funding for several new place-based initiatives intended to improve 
educational quality and attainment in distinct regions or neighborhoods, rather than along 
traditional school district or state boundaries. The Appalachian region fared well in the 
competitive grant programs that resulted.  
With this research, I intend to contribute to the field in three major ways. First, I 
seek to enhance our understanding of contexts and conditions, such as unique aspects of 
the Appalachian educator labor market, that could inform statewide or place-based policy 
design and implementation. Second, I aim to contribute knowledge of patterns and trends 
to inform future research about causal effects of policy, and mechanisms driving those 
effects, in Appalachia, rural areas, and beyond. “More scholarly attention to rural schools 
is needed if policymakers are to address meaningfully the needs of these students” 
(Sipple & Brent, 2008). Third, I seek to contribute stronger conceptual frameworks to 
describe relationships between two primary statewide education policies of the last two 
decades designed to increase educational quality and attainment: school accountability 
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(part of standards-based education reforms) and educator labor markets (part of human 
capital reforms). Ultimately, further knowledge and better frameworks can support policy 
leaders and researchers in examining the trade-offs between statewide versus place-based 
education policies.  
1.2 Context and Conditions  
1.2.1 Economic Conditions  
Central Appalachia – a region that encompasses the eastern half of Kentucky and 
slivers of West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee – has long been a place where 
individuals and families struggle with the question of whether to move to places with 
better economic opportunity or stay in hopes that opportunity in their communities will 
improve. Ziliak (2012) notes that this “region apart” has made significant progress since 
implementation of the federal Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965 yet 
continues to grapple with persistent and intergenerational poverty. According to 2012-16 
American Community Survey estimates, 18 of the 54 Appalachian counties in Kentucky 
had poverty rates above 30 percent. Between 2009 and 2018, the U.S. Census Small Area 
Income & Poverty Estimates Program estimates that the average poverty rate for children 
between the ages of 5 and 17 in Appalachian counties in Kentucky was 33 percent, 
compared to an average of 23 percent in Kentucky counties outside of Appalachia.  
According to the Appalachian Regional Commission, most Appalachian counties in 
Kentucky fall into the nation’s lowest categorization for economic conditions – 
Economically Distressed (see Figure 1.1). Between 2009 and 2018, five counties 
progressed in severity – two from At-Risk to Economically Distressed and three from 
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Transitional to At-Risk. Meanwhile, three counties improved in economic conditions, 
moving from At-Risk to Transitional. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Appalachian Counties in Kentucky, 2009 to 2018 
Data source: Appalachian Regional Commission 
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1.2.2 Economic Mobility 
Economic research using large data sets has shaped our understanding of the 
causal role of place – even to the Census tract level – in enhancing or dampening 
economic mobility (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014). Research has also helped 
identify potential policy solutions to increase economic mobility. These policy solutions 
may be crafted to help individuals or families move to places that have greater positive 
effects on mobility, such as a Seattle/King County housing voucher and support program 
examined in Bergman et al. (2019). Alternatively, they may be designed to improve 
economic mobility within a place. Data from the U.S. Census and Opportunity Insights 
finds heterogeneity in economic mobility across Appalachian counties in Kentucky, but 
almost exclusively across the bottom half of the distribution. Relative to the nation, 
upward mobility in Appalachian counties in Kentucky appears particularly dampened for 
those who grew up in middle income households.  
1.2.3 Residential Mobility 
Although Appalachia has suffered population loss due to several waves of out-
migration, across the region, residents have a high propensity to stay in place: analysis of 
ACS data indicate that in 27 Appalachian counties in Kentucky, more than 40 percent of 
residents live in the same Census tract in which they lived as children – some of the 
highest rates in the nation. This propensity seems to be lower in the larger towns in the 
region. Implementation of the 1965 Act, which created the Appalachian Regional 
Commission, focused economic development strategies on the larger towns in the region 
rather than in its more rural areas (Ziliak, 2012).  
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1.2.4 Labor Markets  
Of the ten Local Workforce Areas (LWA) that Kentucky uses to define regional 
labor markets (see Figure 1.2), the Appalachian region encompasses five: the entirety of 
the EKCEP LWA, and parts of Tenco, Bluegrass, Cumberlands, and South Central.  
 
Figure 1.2 Local Workforce Areas 
Data source: Kentucky Education and Workforce Development Cabinet 
 
1.2.5 Preschool-12 Education Funding  
Federal, state, and local revenue sources fund full-day, academic year instruction 
and educational services for all first grade to 12th grade students enrolled in public school 
districts and state special schools, half-day to full-day kindergarten, and half-day to full 
day preschool for 3- and 4-year old students with identified disabilities and/or who meet 
income eligibility requirements. For fiscal year 2018, Kentucky’s public education 
system made total expenditures of about $9.0 billion; state revenues contributed about 56 
percent of total revenues, 33 percent came from local sources, and federal funding 
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contributed the final 11 percent (Kentucky School Report Card, 2018). Kentucky 
distributed nearly $3 billion in General Fund revenues, primarily through the SEEK 
funding formula. The formula includes a legislatively-set guaranteed base funding per 
pupil, calculated through average daily attendance, along with additional weighted 
funding for students based on eligibility for the national Free and Reduced Price Lunch 
program, Limited English Proficiency services, exceptional child services, home/hospital 
services, and transportation funding. The formula then considers “Local Effort”, the 
amount of local revenue that will be raised, given the local assessed property value, with 
a minimum tax levy of $0.30 per $100 in assessed property value. SEEK funding to the 
district then equals the difference between the amount of funding generated by the 
formula and Local Effort. Through an additional tier to the formula, the state equalizes 
additional local tax revenue.  
The state also sets minimum teacher salaries for all teachers, including public 
preschool teachers, through a minimum salary schedule based on bands of years of 
experience and Ranks based on education degrees and credits earned. Each district sets its 
own salary schedule with the state minimum as a floor. Although the state’s minimum 
salary schedule establishes years of experience bands (0-3 years, 4-9 years, 10-14 years, 
15-19 years, and 20 years and over), most district-level salary schedules increase base 
salaries for teachers with each additional year of experience (Kentucky Department of 
Education School District Personnel Information, 2020). A Rank I indicates that a teacher 
has received a master’s degree and at least 30 additional credits, Rank II indicates that a 
teacher has received a master’s degree, and Rank III is for a bachelor’s degree with 
teacher certification. Teachers may also have Ranks IV or V if they have not yet attained 
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a bachelor’s degree with certification, which is seen as emergency certification. Some 
districts also offer an additional salary increase for teachers with doctoral degrees. All 
districts also offer a salary supplement to teachers who have attained National Board 
Certification; state General Fund allocations help offset these costs. Across districts, the 
salary schedules are right-skewed, with far higher salaries in the two most populous 
districts, Jefferson County Public Schools (Louisville) and Fayette County Public 
Schools (Lexington), holding teacher years of experience and rank constant. 
In response to a lawsuit brought by property-poor, primarily rural Appalachian 
districts in Kentucky, the Kentucky Supreme Court found the state’s education finance 
and governance systems unconstitutional in its Rose vs. Council for Better Education 
(1989) ruling. The legislature’s response, the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 
mandated the SEEK funding formula to dampen inequities across school districts based 
on property assessments. The state raised additional revenues to fund its contribution to 
the formula through a $0.01 higher statewide sales tax. In addition to the formula, the 
legislation enacted an array of local financial requirements and technical assistance to 
level the financial playing field. Although this package of reforms had its intended impact 
of diminishing inequities across districts (Streams, Butler, Cowen, Fowles, & Toma, 
2011), the funding gap between wealthier and poorer districts has reemerged, with 
property-poor counties in Appalachia falling behind with voluntary local revenue for 
education (Combs, Foster, & Toma, 2018).   
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1.3 Policy Landscape 
1.3.1  Federal Policy Shifts 
The years from 2009 to 2015 marked a dynamic era for U.S. elementary and 
secondary education policy. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) included several formula and competitive grant programs that tied funding to 
state commitments to make policy and implementation changes to academic standards, 
student assessments, teacher evaluation and effectiveness systems, state longitudinal data 
systems, and interventions in low-performing schools, including charter schools. These 
included commitments in the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), the School 
Improvement Grant (SIG) program, and the competitive Race to the Top (RTTT) and 
Investing in Innovation (I3) programs. The U.S. Department of Education ultimately 
awarded Kentucky a small RTTT grant in its third competitive round – the state’s 
application score total diminished due to a lack of public charter school authorizing 
legislation.  
By 2011, Congress was four years overdue in reauthorizing the 2001 version of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB), which included a requirement that state accountability systems incentivize all 
students to reach proficiency in reading and mathematics by 2014. Faced with the near-
term prospect of most schools in the nation failing to meet accountability requirements, 
the U.S. Department of Education exercised its broad waiver authority from the federal 
statute. It implemented a new ESEA waiver program in 2011 that allowed states to forgo 
NCLB’s accountability structure that implicated all schools in favor of a new structure 
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focused on the schools in the lowest five percent of achievement. In exchange, the waiver 
program required states to meet tight commitments to meet the policy goals outlined in 
ARRA programs.  
Soon after implementation of the waiver program, Congress settled on a new 
reauthorization of ESEA that codified many of the policies included in the ARRA and 
ESEA waiver programs, including approaches to standards, assessments, and 
accountability structures. This reauthorization, the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015 
(ESSA), however, did not include policy requirements or incentives pertaining to teacher 
evaluation and effectiveness, and even removed the highly qualified teacher requirements 
from the NCLB version of the law.  
1.3.2 State Policy Reforms 
At the state level, Kentucky responded to national and federal shifts through a set 
of human capital and standards-based education reforms called Unbridled Learning. The 
Kentucky General Assembly set the reforms in motion in March 2009 through legislation 
that required the state’s education leaders to revise academic standards for all students 
enrolled in the state’s public elementary, middle, and high schools, with full 
implementation by the 2011-12 academic year. Kentucky’s legislation was an extension 
of a decades-long tradition of statewide human capital and standards-based education 
reforms led by rural, Southern states faced with economic challenges. Policy leaders who 
have championed these reforms have cited a need to improve education quality and 
attainment to promote economic growth and international competitiveness. They have 
also argued that human capital and standards-based reforms, particularly in conjunction 
increased funding and changes to state K-12 funding formulas, would encourage 
11 
 
equitable educational opportunities across more and less economically advantaged areas 
of their states.  
Kentucky’s Senate Bill 1 legislation required that the revised standards “focus on 
critical knowledge, skills, and capacities needed for success in the global economy”, 
“consider international benchmarks”, and align “from elementary to high school to 
postsecondary education so students can be successful at each level” (SB1, 2009). It 
outlined changes to the state’s system of student assessments and school accountability 
metrics intended to increase incentives for schools to prepare students for postsecondary 
education. Kentucky implemented the Unbridled Learning academic standards, new 
KPREP assessments, and accountability model in the 2011-12 school year, meeting the 
legislative deadline. These shifts corresponded in time to work across states, led by the 
National Governor’s Association and the Council of State Chief School Officers, to 
develop a set of core academic standards in English language arts/literacy and 
mathematics for states to voluntary adopt. Kentucky became the first state to adopt and 
administer assessments aligned to what became known as the Common Core State 
Standards. It was also one of the first states to adopt new science standards based on the 
Next Generation Science Standards. It was among a handful of states to build multiple 
metrics of “college and career readiness” into its high school accountability model, 
including ACT college admissions test scores and scores on career readiness assessments. 
Chapter 4 focuses in more detail on the design of the model for elementary and middle 
schools.  
In response to requirements in the federal ESEA waiver program, Kentucky 
leaders committed to developing new statewide teacher and principal evaluation systems. 
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The Kentucky Board of Education (KBE) outlined requirements for the systems, 
including requirements that the systems include student growth data, meaningfully 
differentiate performance, and inform personnel decisions. The Kentucky Department of 
Education (KDE) partnered with the Kentucky Education Association (KEA), the state’s 
membership organization for certified and classified educators, to develop the 
Professional Growth and Evaluation System (PGES). The Measures of Effective 
Teaching (MET) project, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and led by Dr. 
Thomas Kane of the Center for Education Policy Research at Harvard University, 
influenced KDE and KEA leaders as they designed the system – which included multiple 
measures including student surveys. In contrast to several states that implemented new 
evaluation systems soon after the ESEA waiver program began, KDE and KEA created a 
prototype design for the model in 2012 and then initiated a multi-year process to pilot and 
refine before full implementation in the 2014-15 school year. Although one of the major 
purposes of the system was to differentiate performance, 93 percent of teachers received 
ratings of “exemplary” or “accomplished” and 95 percent achieved “high” or “expected” 
student growth ratings (Kentucky School Report Card, 2014-15). In more than half of 
districts, 100 percent of teachers achieved these ratings.    
With the shift at the federal level from the ESEA waiver program to ESSA, 
Kentucky’s legislature passed a new Senate Bill 1 in spring 2016 and did so with an 
emergency clause. This new legislation required adoption of new standards in all subject 
areas and a new school accountability model. It also prohibited KDE from requiring 
districts to implement the PGES and prohibited state agencies from collecting 
information about teacher and principal evaluation ratings.   
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1.3.3 Statewide and Place-Based Policy 
State governments – on their own accord or in response to mandates and 
incentives from the federal government – have been the primary locus of policy change 
for U.S. education reforms. Even NCLB, which imposed the most prescriptive national 
requirements for human capital reforms (e.g. highly-qualified teachers) and standards-
based reforms (e.g. criterion-based assessments, adequate yearly progress, and school 
interventions) of any ESEA reauthorization, delegated tremendous authority to states 
(Peterson & West, 2003).  Typically, states have designed statewide policies; these apply 
to all local school districts and schools in the same way. Many states, however, include 
wide variation in contexts and conditions that may affect policy success. This could 
include variation at the regional level to the neighborhood level. In addition, similar 
conditions and contexts may cross state boundaries. For example, rural school districts in 
the Four Corners region of the U.S. southwest – San Juan District (Utah), Montezuma-
Cortez District (Colorado), Central Consolidated Schools (New Mexico), and Red Mesa 
Unified District (Arizona) likely share common characteristics yet operate under four 
distinct state education policies. 
The federal government has, however, supported development of some “place-
based” approaches to improving educational quality and attainment; these center not on 
statewide policies but on specific regions or communities. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, 
the Promise Neighborhood competitive grant program sought to “significantly improve 
the educational and developmental outcomes of children and youth in our most distressed 
communities” (U.S. Department of Education, 2019). Although the program was inspired 
by the Harlem Children’s Zone in New York City, the largest amount of total funding 
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between 2010 and 2016 went to two grantees serving economically distressed rural areas: 
Berea College serving Appalachian Kentucky and the Delta Health Alliance serving the 
Mississippi Delta (U.S. Department of Education, 2019). Each has received nearly $60 
million through the Promise Neighborhood program. The U.S. Department of Education 
also opened the RTTT competitive grant program to individual school districts or 
regional collaboratives of school districts. The Kentucky Valley Educational Cooperative 
(KVEC), which serves 17 school districts in Central Appalachia, received a $30 million, 
four-year RTTT grant to strengthen technology infrastructure and capacity for 
personalized learning.  
Ziliak (2019) notes that Congress has been wary of place-based policies for a 
couple of reasons, including political concerns about picking winners and losers, and 
concerns that investment in specific places would encourage in-migration rather than help 
improve opportunities for current residents. He argues, however, that the distinct, 
persistent struggles in areas such as Central Appalachia dampen concerns about political 
favoritism, and that in practice, in-migration was not seen following enactment of several 
place-based policies.  
Although place-based policy has been rare in education, particularly for state 
education policy, Kentucky and several other states recognize formal structures for place-
based policy implementation. In addition to KVEC, Kentucky has seven other regional 
educational cooperatives and one educational cooperative that serves its largest district, 
Jefferson County (see Figure 1.3). All school districts within KVEC are also Appalachian 
counties. Appalachian school districts are also in the KEDC, CKEC, SESC, and GRREC 
cooperatives. Cooperatives provide professional development for educators within their 
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regions, as well as staff to provide technical assistance on federal and state policy 
implementation. Districts provide funding for the cooperatives, which also administer 
programs funded by grants.  
 
Figure 1.3 Kentucky’s Educational Cooperatives 
 Data source: Kentucky School Report Card 
 
1.4 Data Overview 
This dissertation research draws on statewide administrative data that includes 
certified educators and students enrolled in public school districts in Kentucky from 2009 
to 2018, under a MOU with the Kentucky Center for Statistics (KYSTATS) and a MOU 
with the Kentucky Department of Education (KDE). KYSTATS provided individual data 
with personal identification codes unique to this project to facilitate longitudinal analysis. 
I leveraged an array of publicly-available aggregate data at the school, district, and 
county levels from sources such as the online Kentucky School Report Card, the National 
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Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data, and the U.S. Census American 
Community Survey and Small Area Income & Poverty Estimates Program. The 
University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board approved this study on December 12, 
2019 (IRB #5482). 
Kentucky has 120 counties. Over the time-period, Kentucky had 73 school districts 
in Appalachian counties and 100 districts outside of Appalachia. (One district 
consolidation, Monticello City and Wayne County, occurred in 2013.) Although most 
school districts in Kentucky are contiguous with county boundaries, 19 include a city 
district carved out of a county-wide district. In Northern Kentucky south of Cincinnati, 
Campbell County includes seven districts and Kenton County includes five districts. Five 
counties in Appalachia – Bell, Boyd, Greenup, Pulaski, and Whitley – include three 
school districts each. 
From 2009 to 2018, the total population of students in Kentucky public school 
districts increased by 1.6 percent (see Table 1.1). The student population attending 
Appalachian school districts, however, decreased by 3.2 percent during this time-period. 
Between 2009 and 2018, the share of Kentucky students in Appalachian districts fell 
from 29.5 percent to 28.1 percent. The number of classroom teachers and schools 
decreased over these years, most dramatically in Appalachia, where the number of 
classroom teachers decreased 9.0 percent and the number of schools decreased by 10.4 
percent. The decrease in teacher positions led to a marked increase in the student-teacher 
ratio in Appalachian counties, moving from 15.2 in 2009 to 16.2 in 2018. Meanwhile, the 
student-teacher ratio outside of Appalachia increased by half as much, from 15.7 to 16.2. 
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Table 1.1 Number of Students, Teachers, and Schools, 2009 and 2018 
 2009 2018 
Percent 
Change 
Students     
Appalachian Districts 197,489 191,072 -3.2 
Districts Outside Appalachia 471,545 489,734 3.9 
Kentucky Total 669,858 680,806 1.6 
    
Classroom Teachers     
Appalachian Districts 12,937 11,775 -9.0 
Districts Outside Appalachia 29,803 30,016 0.7 
Kentucky Total 42,740 41,791 -2.2 
    
Schools    
Appalachian Districts 538 482 -10.4 
Districts Outside Appalachia 988 996 0.8 
Kentucky Total 1526 1478 -3.1 
 
Between 2009 and 2018, annual salaries of classroom teachers in Kentucky (in 
2018 constant dollars) fell steadily (see Table 1.2). For classroom teachers with five years 
of experience and a Rank II, average salaries fell from $51,065 in 2009 to $47,094 in 
2018. For teachers with 15 years of experience and a Rank I, average salaries fell from 
$66,996 to $62,060 over this time-period.  
Regional differences in teacher salaries tell diverging stories depending on 
whether the data are adjusted for cost of living. Without these adjustments, teachers in 
Appalachian districts, on average, earn less each year than teachers outside of Appalachia 
with the same years of experience and rank – and these differences are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. These differences are more pronounced for teachers 
with more experience and higher rank; the regional gap has also increased over time. We 
know from prior work, however, that taking cost-of-living differences into account can 
show a salary premium for teachers in Appalachian districts (Streams et al., 2011; 
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Streams et al., 2013). NCES has published district-level data that can be used for this 
adjustment; however, these data are only available for the 2016, 2017, and 2018 
academic years. The Comparable Wage Index for Teacher (CWIFT) uses data from the 
American Community Survey to update the comparable wage index (Taylor & Fowler Jr, 
2006). Applying this adjustment for the 2018 academic year suggests that for teachers 
with five years of experience and a Rank II, salaries in Appalachian districts are higher 
than salaries in districts outside of Appalachia, at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. For teachers with 15 years of experience and a Rank I, however, the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 1.2 Regional Differences in Teacher Salary, 2009 and 2018 
 2009 2018 
Average Teacher Salary  
5 yrs of experience, Rank II  
  
Appalachian Districts 50,173 44,963 
Districts Outside Appalachia 51,380 47,727 
Difference  -1,207*** -2,764*** 
   
Average Teacher Salary  
15 yrs of experience, Rank I  
  
Appalachian Districts 64,079 56,325 
Districts Outside Appalachia 68,939 64,266 
Difference -4,859*** -7,941*** 
   
Adjusted with CWIFT   
Average Teacher Salary  
5 yrs of experience, Rank II  
  
Appalachian Districts - 58,543 
Districts Outside Appalachia - 55,891 
Difference  - 2,652*** 
Average Teacher Salary  
15 yrs of experience, Rank I 
($2018) 
  
Appalachian Districts - 74,166 
Districts Outside Appalachia - 74,909 
Difference - 742 
*=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001 
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1.5 Research Overview 
In Chapter 2, I extend Cowen et al. (2012), using a discrete time duration model 
to estimate relationships between teacher, district, policy, and place factors on teacher 
attrition and cross-district mobility. This essay enhances the previous study by including 
information that was not previously available: student academic achievement and growth, 
teachers’ perceptions of working conditions, and degree of rurality (fringe, distant, or 
remote). It also evaluates changes over time pre- and post-implementation of Unbridled 
Learning reforms. It does not estimate causal relationships among these factors, but rather 
provides additional empirical evidence about associations among them.  
Although many teachers remain in the classroom throughout their careers, 
districts and schools offer several positions for certified educators that can open doors to 
more diverse career pathways. These can include school-based instructional coach or 
curriculum positions, school-based administrative positions such as assistant principals or 
deans of students, and district-based instructional or curriculum positions, in addition to 
traditional administrative positions such as principal. All school districts in Kentucky set 
classroom teacher salaries according to a “step and lane” salary schedule that increases 
salaries as teachers gain additional years of experience and degrees. As these positions 
increase base pay, in contrast to “extra-duty” stipends for performing additional roles or 
tasks, they could be a desirable path for teachers motivated to increase their salary 
without pursuing an administrative career track. From the perspective of administrators, 
providing certified educators more career options – and higher-paying options – may be a 
strategy to reward educators who have attained desirable knowledge and skills such as 
leading their peers, building curriculum and assessments, or analyzing data. It could also 
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help increase capacity through shifts in state policy such as Unbridled Learning’s new 
standards or teacher evaluation protocols. In Chapter 3, I contribute descriptive analyses 
to enhance understanding of staffing and educator career pathways, following Fowles et 
al. (2013) and Brewer (1996). The analyses include trends over time and patterns across 
district types, including Appalachian districts and Kentucky districts outside Appalachia.   
Finally, in Chapter 4, I extend the vast literature on school accountability (Bonilla 
& Dee, 2020; Figlio & Ladd, 2008; Figlio & Lucas, 2004; Gormley & Weimer, 1999; 
Kogan, Lavertu, & Peskowitz, 2016a, 2016b) and its interaction with educator labor 
markets (Feng, Figlio, & Sass, 2018; Reback, Rockoff, & Schwartz, 2014). It employs a 
regression discontinuity model to estimate the causal effect of a “report card” aspect of 
Kentucky’s Unbridled Learning accountability system on principal turnover, and on 
student academic growth in reading and mathematics at the highest and lowest ends of 
the performance distribution. In Chapter 5, I discuss primary findings from the research, 
identify gaps and limitations, and explore research questions and analyses to build on this 
work.
 
 
CHAPTER 2. TEACHER MOBILITY AND ATTRITION 
2.1 Introduction 
How do place and policy relate to teacher mobility and attrition? A vast empirical 
literature has informed understanding of the role of teacher and school characteristics – as 
well as policy changes – on mobility across schools and attrition from the profession 
(Borman & Dowling, 2008; Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006; Nguyen, Pham, 
Springer, & Crouch, 2019). A few studies, such as Boyd et al. (2005), using statewide 
data from New York, have helped us visualize the local nature of teacher labor markets. 
Only a handful, including Cowen et al. (2012) and Fowles et al. (2013) on the 
Appalachian region of Kentucky, have taken a broader lens to examine the relationship 
between place – distinct regions or neighborhoods shaped by shared economic 
conditions, historical contexts, and cultures – and the mobility and attrition of teachers.  
With data on all Kentucky teachers from 2009 to 2018, I describe patterns of 
inter-district mobility and attrition inside and outside the Appalachian region, and use a 
discrete time duration model to estimate the relationship between employment in the 
Appalachian region and the risk of inter-district mobility and attrition. I also explore the 
relationship between mobility and attrition and implementation of the Unbridled Learning 
statewide education policy reforms in 2012, which could have affected teacher mobility 
and attrition through demand and supply. Some of its provisions – such as an increased 
focus on meeting high school college and career readiness measures– could have affected 
demand for teachers with certain knowledge and skills, such as career and technical 
education. The policy reforms could have had supply effects, as well. District responses 
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to the reforms could have had supply effects – teachers who value attributes such as more 
support for transition to new standards and assessments could have been more likely to 
move. Teachers could have also been more likely to leave the profession if the changes 
put in place by the reforms – such as a new accountability system or evaluation system 
with more observations, use of student surveys, and student learning objectives in 
evaluation ratings – led to lower job satisfaction. I compare these results to those from 
Cowen et al. (2012) on an earlier period from 1986 to 2005, which included the 
implementation of the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 – a sweeping policy 
change and implementation challenge that led to teachers fleeing the profession. Building 
on previous work, I consider 1) various constructs of place, including Appalachian 
region, local workforce development areas and regional education cooperatives, 2) the 
relationship of student achievement/academic growth, 3) teacher perceptions of school 
working conditions, and 4) degree of rurality (fringe, distant, or remote) on mobility and 
attrition. 
2.2 Motivation 
Within schools, educators serve as the greatest driver of educational outcomes 
such as student academic growth as measured by test scores (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 
2005) – as well as later life outcomes such as postsecondary attainment (Chetty, 
Friedman, et al., 2014). We see variation across schools and districts in educators in 
terms of quality inputs – years of experience, degrees and credentials, prior evidence of 
academic ability – as well as variation in educators’ effectiveness in improving student 
outcomes (see Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006) on variation in teacher effectiveness and 
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Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2012) and Loeb, Kalogrides, and Horng (2010) on 
variation in principal effectiveness). Feng and Sass (2016) use Florida school data to find 
that teachers in the highest and lowest quartiles of value-added impact on student 
achievement are most likely to leave the profession. In terms of teacher mobility, they 
find that teachers are more likely to move toward schools that fit their own value-added 
impact; in other words, higher value-added teachers are more likely to move to schools 
with higher proportions of higher value-added teachers, which exacerbates differences in 
teacher quality across schools. It is not clear whether teachers initiate moves to schools 
with teachers with similar levels of impact, or whether principals recruit them. This 
variation has disparate effects on schools based on their characteristics: lower-poverty 
schools on average benefit from more experienced and highly-effective teachers and 
principals, while higher-poverty schools face challenges from a larger share of novice 
teachers and principals and less-effective teachers and principals (Clotfelter, Ladd, 
Vigdor, & Wheeler, 2006). 
Although one source of this variation lies in relationships and preferences that 
determine initial placement of teachers during or after educator preparation programs, a 
substantial source emerges from patterns of teacher mobility and attrition following 
initial placement (Ingersoll, 2001). Evidence suggest that nationally, the weight of heavy  
teacher mobility and attrition is felt in high-poverty urban and rural schools (Sipple & 
Brent, 2008). As such, a primary motivation for this research is to further the empirical 
literature and deepen our knowledge base on teacher labor markets in isolated, 
economically distressed, largely rural areas such as Appalachia, and particularly how 
place relates to teacher mobility and attrition. This knowledge base can support 
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evaluation of policies designed to change conditions in these areas as “the long-term 
effect of using these strategies and incentives to increase the size of an applicant pool, to 
recruit a teacher once an offer is made, and to retain teachers in remote locations is not 
well understood,” (Sipple & Brent, 2008). 
Research questions include the following: 
1. Do patterns of teacher inter-district mobility and attrition from 2009 to 2018 
suggest that Appalachian counties in Kentucky constitute an isolated, fixed 
teacher labor market? How do these patterns and trends across Appalachia 
compare to other geographic designations in Kentucky (e.g. local workforce 
development areas or educational cooperatives)? 
2. Do teachers in Appalachia from 2009 to 2018 have a higher or lower 
likelihood of inter-district mobility than those outside Appalachia? How does 
this compare to the results in the 1986-2005 period? 
3. Do teachers in Appalachia from 2009 to 2018 have a higher or lower 
likelihood of attrition from the profession than those outside Appalachia? 
How does this compare to the results in the 1986-2005 period? 
4. How does the risk of inter-district mobility or attrition change before and after 
implementation of Kentucky’s package of education reforms in 2012? How 
does this compare to the results before and after Kentucky’s education reform 
in 1990? Does this differ inside and outside Appalachia? 
5. How does the degree of rurality (fringe, distant, remote) relate to the risk of 
teacher mobility and teacher attrition? 
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6. How does the risk of mobility and attrition relate to perceptions of teacher 
working conditions, and how does this relationship differ for districts inside 
Appalachia and outside Appalachia? 
7. How does the risk of mobility and attrition relate to student achievement and 
growth, and how does this relationship differ for districts inside Appalachia 
and outside Appalachia? 
2.3 Literature Review 
A vast literature has examined the factors that are associated with or influence 
teacher mobility and attrition from the profession. Updating previous reviews from 
Borman and Dowling (2008) and Guarino et al. (2006), a recent meta-analysis of 120 
studies from 1980 to 2018 categorized these into three broad factors: personal, school, 
and external (Nguyen et al., 2019).  
Personal factors include age, gender, race/ethnicity, academic achievement, 
degrees earned, teaching in STEM or special education fields, preparation program, 
National Board certification, and years of experience. Of these, evidence suggests that 
teacher turnover (which could come from mobility or attrition) is most likely for teachers 
younger than 28, those with young children, those with higher academic achievement 
(e.g. college GPA, SAT or ACT test scores), teachers with less than three years of 
experience, and those teaching in STEM and special education fields. They also find 
evidence that Hispanic teachers are less likely to turnover. 
Since Ingersoll (2001), scholars have examined how organizational factors affect 
mobility and attrition. The Nguyen et al. (2019) meta-analysis focused on school size, 
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urbanicity, grade level (elementary, middle, or high school), student discipline, class size, 
instructional assistants, student achievement factors, the percentage of Black students and 
Hispanic students, the percentage of economically disadvantaged students, and the 
percentage of students with individualized education plans. They also examined factors 
such as perceptions of administrative support, induction/mentoring programs, 
professional development, quality of resources such as instructional materials, and 
principal effectiveness. Of these, they found that teacher turnover is most closely 
associated with middle schools, schools with higher rates of discipline incidents, with 
weaker administrative support, less opportunity for induction/mentoring, and lower 
quality professional development. They find little evidence that the student population is 
associated with teacher turnover. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004), however, use 
Texas data to show that the characteristics of students in schools, such as race/ethnicity 
and achievement, directly affect teacher mobility and attrition – with teachers more likely 
to leave schools with lower student achievement and higher proportions of black and 
Hispanic students.   
Although the meta-analysis groups mobility and attrition together as outcomes 
and often focuses on one factor at a time, there is evidence to suggest that there is 
substantial value in estimating mobility and attrition separately and interacting factors. 
For example, in examining the 1999-2000 SASS and 2000-2001 Teacher Follow Up 
Survey, Kukla-Acevedo (2009) found age to be a significant modifier of results, with 
workplace conditions having less impact for experienced teachers. Behavioral climate 
was a substantial contributor to first-year teachers’ decisions to leave or move. The study 
found difference relationships between workplace conditions and mobility or attrition 
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events – for example, administrative support was significantly related to mobility 
decisions but not to attrition.  
Finally, the Nguyen et al. (2019) meta-analysis examined external factors such as 
teacher evaluation and other policy shifts, merit pay programs, salary increases, and the 
employment rate in the area. Findings suggest that teacher evaluation policies, merit pay 
policies, principal effectiveness, and salary increases are associated with lower turnover, 
while late hiring policies are associated with increased turnover.  
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
Following Dolton (2006), each teacher labor market includes a pool of teachers 
that constitutes supply and a group of schools that require a certain number of teachers 
with specific characteristics, constituting demand. Student enrollment and class size 
targets primarily drive demand for teachers. Demand increases with higher enrollments 
and smaller class sizes. It decreases with lower enrollments and larger class sizes. Supply 
includes the current supply of teachers – new teachers, continuing teachers, and teachers 
who are returning after a year or more outside of teaching. It also includes the potential 
supply of teachers, primarily those who have left teaching before retirement but who may 
return to the profession.  
Earlier work suggests that school districts within the Appalachian region of 
Kentucky constitute an isolated, fixed labor market beginning with initial placement and 
continuing to patterns of inter-district mobility and attrition from the profession (Cowen 
et al., 2012; Fowles et al., 2013). The unique characteristics of the Appalachian teacher 
labor market could not be explained by traditional teacher, district, or policy factors. 
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Cowen et al. (2012) suggested, for example, that “there is something about being in 
Appalachia that appears to influence teacher mobility other than common, measurable 
characteristics.”  
• Patterns and trends: I expect analyses will suggest that between 2009 to 
2018, Appalachian counties in Kentucky remained an isolated, fixed labor 
market for teachers, apart from similar boundaries such as local workforce 
areas and educational cooperatives.  
Descriptive data analyses suggest that from 2009 to 2018, teacher and district 
factors may have increased the likelihood for inter-district mobility and attrition for all 
Kentucky teachers, but particularly those teaching in Appalachian counties. For example, 
teacher salaries in Appalachian school districts, on average and in constant 2018 dollars, 
experienced a greater percent change decrease than teacher salaries outside Appalachia. 
Student-teacher ratios increased at a higher rate inside Appalachia than outside 
Appalachia. Although districts in Appalachia had declining demand for teachers due to 
lower student enrollments, they also appear to have increased class sizes, lowering 
demand even further than would be expected given enrollment shifts.  
In this conceptual framework, the risk of a teacher transferring between school 
districts or leaving the profession is a function of teacher factors such as age, experience, 
and credentials; district factors; and policy factors. It is also a function of place, such as 
teaching in an Appalachian school district.  
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• Policy: Inter-district mobility and attrition for teachers will be no more or 
less likely after implementation of the 2012 Unbridled Learning policy 
changes. 
• Place:  
o Appalachian status will decrease the likelihood of inter-district 
mobility due to spatial fixity or attachment to place.  
o Appalachian status will increase the likelihood of attrition from the 
profession for teachers less than 28 years old due to factors such as 
lack of child care options, and decrease the likelihood of attrition 
from the profession for teachers 28 years or older, due to lack of 
alternative career opportunities.  
2.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset includes data elements at the individual level for all certified 
educators working in Kentucky’s school districts, as well as individual assessment and 
data on Kentucky students from grades 3 to 8 between 2009 and 2018. The data have 
been made available for research and evaluation through a MOU with the Kentucky 
Center for Statistics and a MOU the Kentucky Department of Education. The Kentucky 
Center for Statistics supplied individual data with unique id’s specific to this project to 
facilitate longitudinal analyses while protecting against disclosure of personally-
identifiable information.  
Educator data from the KDE Munis database include job classification code – 
which I collapsed into nine certified educator role categories: classroom teachers, school-
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based instructional consultants, school administrators (e.g. dean of students, assistant 
principal), principals, district-based leaders (e.g. chief academic officer, district 
assessment coordinator), district superintendent, district-based staff, and school based 
specialists. The ninth “role” is for extra duty work. For purposes of this analysis, I 
focused on classroom teachers, although the other roles are taken into account to restrict 
the number of teachers coded as leavers for the attrition dependent variable. The data also 
include the school and district, years of experience, and annual salary (including base 
salary and stipends for supplemental pay), which I have adjusted to 2018 constant dollars. 
The educator master person data include year of birth, gender, and race/ethnicity. Finally, 
educator credential data include the year that educators attained certification based on 
Rank I, II, and III – from these data I constructed annual variables indicative of the 
educator’s current Rank as of that academic year. 
Available data from the Kentucky Center for Statistics proved insufficient to 
construct variables for educators’ undergraduate institution (educator college program 
data) and classroom teachers’ subject taught (courses data). The undergraduate institution 
data were available for a subset of teachers; in Chapter 3, I will analyze these data to 
show patterns of placement in and outside of Appalachia by the location of the 
institution. The courses dataset includes students, their grade level, school district, and 
course-taking. It also connects their courses to individual educators. These data, 
unfortunately, did not connect to a sufficient number of teachers to permit meaningful 
analysis.  
Student-level data from 2009 to 2018 include scale scores for all state-
administered assessments, grade level, school and district of enrollment, graduation and 
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year, year of birth, gender, and race/ethnicity. I standardized assessment scale scores as z-
scores for 3rd to 8th grade reading and mathematics assessments from 2009 to 2018. This 
permitted analysis through the state’s shift in assessments in 2012, along with grade-to-
grade and year-to-year comparisons. I also constructed a basic individual student growth 
model defined as change in z-scores between grade/years (e.g. 4th grade in 2012 z-score – 
3rd grade in 2011 z-score). Finally, I constructed quintiles of z-scores for each year, to 
permit analysis that showed growth for students at the top and bottom quintiles of 
achievement. For this analysis, I averaged these at the district level.  
Teacher perceptions of working conditions are from the TELL Working 
Conditions Survey under an MOU with the Kentucky Department of Education. I have 
created variables that indicate average ratings (from 1 to 4, with 4 representing the most 
favorable rating) along seven constructs, along with a composite measure: Time, 
Resources, Professional Learning, Community Support, Managing Student Conduct, 
Teacher Leadership, and Principal Leadership. Degree of rurality at the district level is 
from the National Center for Education Statistics. Place descriptors include Appalachian 
status (Appalachian Regional Commission), dummy variables for each of 10 local 
workforce areas (Kentucky Center for Statistics), and dummy variables for each of 9 
educational cooperatives (Kentucky School Report Card).  
Inter-district mobility is identified for teachers between 2009 and 2017 as a 1 if 
the teacher appears in a different district the following year. Between 2009 to 2017, 
classroom teachers made 10,057 moves across districts (Table 2.1). A total of 2,526 
originated in Appalachian districts; of these, 818 (32.4 percent) were moves to districts 
outside of Appalachia. In contrast, 7,478 cross-district moves originated in districts 
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outside of Appalachia; of these, 597 (7.9 percent) included moves to districts in 
Appalachia. Breaking the information out by year, we see a clear pattern of increasing 
numbers of cross-district moves overall throughout the state, both in Appalachia in 
districts outside Appalachia. Moves from Appalachia to outside Appalachia increased by 
90.6 percent while moves outside Appalachia to Appalachia increased by 61.1 percent.  
Table 2.1 Cross-District Mobility, Classroom Teachers 
Year 
Total 
Mobility 
Mobility 
within 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Mobility 
within 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia  
Mobility 
from 
Appalachia 
to Outside 
Appalachia 
Mobility 
from 
Outside 
Appalachia 
to 
Appalachia 
Total 
Teachers 
2009 837 134 585 64 54 42,798 
2010 880 162 594 71 52 43,086 
2011 967 180 644 79 64 43,111 
2012 946 148 648 79 64 42,832 
2013 1026 153 678 81 69 42,287 
2014 1229 174 873 96 86 41,507 
2015 1373 261 931 109 72 42,012 
2016 1398 237 995 117 49 41,475 
2017 1401 259 933 122 87 41,726 
Total 10,057 1708 6881 818 597 67,109 
(distinct) 
 
Examining mobility data by years of experience, it is more common for teachers 
to make cross-district moves in their first five years of teaching and particularly after the 
first year of teaching. A total of 1,404 teachers made cross-district moves after the first 
year of teaching, as compared to 1,088 after the second year.  
Attrition is restricted in two ways to capture permanent exits not due to 
retirement. First, it is restricted to cases between years 2009 and 2015 if the teacher is in 
the dataset as a classroom teacher, is not in the dataset as a certified educator in the 
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following year, and does not return to the dataset as a certified educator in at least the 
next three years. For example, if a teacher is in the dataset in 2014 but is missing from the 
dataset in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018, the teacher will be coded as a permanent exit 
(attrition). If a teacher is in the dataset in 2009 but does not appear in the dataset in 2010, 
2011, 2012, or 2013, the teacher will be coded as a permanent exit. Teachers coded as 
permanent exits who are likely to have retired (26 years of experience or over the age of 
59) will not be included in the attrition variable. Ultimately, the teacher attrition variable 
captures those who are most likely to have made an elective exit from the teaching (or 
other certified educator) profession in Kentucky’s public schools prior to retirement. It is 
also possible that teachers have been counseled out of the profession, or, in the case of 
teachers with less than five years of experience, could have been denied tenure. These 
teachers may have secured employment in non-public schools, changed professions, 
moved outside of Kentucky, or left the workforce.   
From 2009 to 2015, 10,757 classroom teachers left Kentucky public school 
districts prior to retirement (Table 2.2). Of these, 2,321 left Appalachian districts and 
8,436 left districts outside of Appalachia. Breaking the information out by year, we see 
that attrition was highest in 2012, the year Unbridled Learning reforms were first 
implemented. 
Table 2.2 Attrition, Classroom Teachers  
Year 
Attrition 
Appalachian 
Districts  
Attrition 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia 
Total 
Attrition 
Total 
Teachers  
2009 234 901 1135 42,798 
2010 276 966 1242 43,086 
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 Table 2.2 (continued) 
2011 357 1318 1675 43,111 
2012 418 1410 1828 42,832 
2013 397 1294 1691 42,287 
2014 331 1205 1536 41,507 
2015 308 1342 1650 42,012 
Total  2,321 8,436 10,757 61,436 
(distinct) 
 
Over these years in across Kentucky, attrition is more common among teachers with less 
than four years of experience, and most common with teachers in their first year of 
teaching – in fact, the number of teachers who left after the first year of teaching – 1,557 
– is nearly double the number who left after the second year – 806. 
 Teachers in Appalachian school districts differ from their counterparts in districts 
outside of Appalachia in several important ways (see Table 2.3). They are slightly more 
likely to be male, far more likely to have a race/ethnicity identification of white, are more 
experienced, and older. They are more likely to have a Rank I certification and to teach at 
the elementary school level. They are also far more likely to be teaching in a rural school 
district, particularly a rural remote district – 20 percent of them do so, as compared to 1 
percent of teachers in districts outside Appalachia. As compared to Cowen et al. (2012) 
for the time-period 1986-2005, these descriptions are consistent for male (although the 
difference was not significantly significant in the earlier time period), white, experience, 
and Rank I. In the earlier time-period, however, teachers in Appalachia were on average 
younger (although the difference was not statistically significant). One major difference 
between the two time periods is teacher salary differences. For the 1986-2005 time-
period, with salary as 2005 dollars, the difference in mean salaries was not statistically 
significant or substantively meaningful. In contrast, during the 2009 to 2018 time-period, 
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the difference is stark: on average, teachers in Appalachia had an annual salary $3,145 
less than teachers outside Appalachia – even though their years of experience and 
credentials were, on average, higher.  
Table 2.3 Characteristics of Teachers in Appalachian and Non-Appalachian 
Districts 
 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia Difference 
Male 0.23 
(0.001) 
0.22 
(0.001) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
Not White 0.02 
(0.0003) 
0.07 
(0.004) 
-0.047*** 
(0.0006) 
Experience  12.5 
(0.024) 
11.2 
(0.015) 
1.34*** 
(0.28) 
Age 42.1 
(0.028) 
41.3 
(0.020) 
0.816*** 
(0.035) 
Age <28 0.06 
(0.001) 
0.08 
(0.0004) 
-0.02*** 
(0.001) 
Annual Salary 
(2018 $) 
52,158 
(25.7) 
55,303 
(22.7) 
-3,145*** 
(34.3) 
Rank I 0.34 
(0.001) 
0.27 
(0.0008) 
0.08*** 
(0.001) 
Rank II 0.49 
(0.001) 
0.53 
(0.001) 
-0.04*** 
(0.002) 
Rank III 0.16 
(0.001) 
0.20 
(0.001) 
-0.04*** 
(0.001) 
Level    
Preschool/ 
Primary 
0.01 
(0.003) 
0.01 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
Elementary 0.52 
(0.001) 
0.48 
(0.001) 
0.038*** 
(0.002) 
Middle 0.18 
(0.001) 
0.20 
(0.001) 
-0.02*** 
(0.001) 
High or 
Combined 
0.28 
(0.001) 
0.28 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Career-
Technical 
0.01 
(0.003) 
0.01 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.004) 
Rural teaching    
Rural fringe 
0.21 
(0.001) 
0.11 
(0.0005) 
0.10*** 
(0.001) 
Rural distant 
0.18 
(0.001) 
0.11 
(0.0005) 
0.08*** 
(0.001) 
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 Table 2.3 (continued) 
Rural remote 
0.20 
(0.001) 
0.01 
(0.0001) 
0.20*** 
(0.001) 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
Districts in Appalachia differ from school districts outside Appalachia along 
several dimensions (Table 2.4). Median household income is $14,417 lower on average 
from 2009 to 2018. School districts in Appalachia have about half the population of 
residents, on average, as districts outside of Appalachia. The population density in 
Appalachian school districts is about 2.5 times lower than outside the region, and the 
school districts are much less likely to have access to an interstate highway. Over the 
time-period of study, the student-teacher ratio within and outside the Appalachian region 
converged. In terms of student population, Appalachian districts have a higher proportion 
of white students and a higher percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch. 
These differences are consistent with those found in the earlier time-period from 1986-
2005.  
Table 2.4 Characteristics of Appalachian and Non-Appalachian Districts 
 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia Difference 
Median HH Income 
(2018 $) 
35,738 
(232) 
50,155 
(297) 
-14,417*** 
(377) 
Population 16,112 
(517) 
32,049 
(2567.5) 
-15,937*** 
(2619) 
Population density 
(per sq.mi) 
286 
(17) 
733 
(40) 
-448*** 
(43) 
Interstate passes 
through district 
0.25 
(0.02) 
0.46 
(0.02) 
-0.21*** 
(0.02) 
Students per teacher 15.8 
(0.06) 
15.9 
(0.06) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
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 Table 2.4 (continued) 
White students 0.95 
(0.001) 
0.84 
(0.004) 
0.11*** 
(0.004) 
Students eligible for 
free or reduced price 
lunch 
0.65 
(0.004) 
0.56 
(0.004) 
0.09*** 
(0.006) 
N 73 100  
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
The TELL working conditions survey was administered to all certified educators 
across Kentucky in 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Results were reported on a central 
website, www.tellkentucky.org, and in 2015 and 2017, some results were reported on the 
Kentucky School Report Card. The response rate for the survey increased over the four 
years, from 80.2 percent in 2011 to 90.9 percent in 2017. In terms of district-level 
variation in average results, educators in Appalachian districts had more favorable ratings 
on average for Professional Learning, Managing Student Conduct, and Time.  
Table 2.5 TELL Working Conditions Survey Results  
 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia Difference 
Composite 3.09 
(0.007) 
3.08 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Resources 3.19 
(0.008) 
3.19 
(0.006) 
<0.001 
(0.01) 
School 
Leadership 
3.19 
(0.008) 
3.18 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Professional 
Learning 
3.04 
(0.008) 
3.00 
(0.007) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Managing St. 
Conduct 
3.11 
(0.008) 
3.08 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.01) 
Teacher 
Leadership 
3.12 
(0.008) 
3.13 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
Community 
Support 
3.08 
(0.008) 
3.09 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.01) 
Time 2.90 
(0.01) 
2.86 
(0.007) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
  *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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From 2009 to 2018, student achievement in Appalachian districts, as measured by 
Kentucky’s annual statewide assessments in grades 3-8 and as compared to student 
achievement in districts outside of Appalachia, was lower in mathematics at both the 
elementary and middle grades levels (Table 2.6). The differences between Appalachian 
and non-Appalachian districts in means for reading, however, was not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  
 
Table 2.6 Student Achievement in Grades 3-8, Reading and Math 
 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia Difference 
Math, Elem -0.072 
(0.008) 
-0.023 
(0.008) 
-0.50*** 
(0.012) 
Math, Middle -0.057 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.68*** 
(0.012) 
Reading, Elem -0.028 
(0.007) 
-0.019 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.01) 
Reading, 
Middle 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.01) 
Average z-scores, 2009 to 2018; *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
From 2010 to 2018, student growth in Appalachian school districts, as measured by 
change in z-scores for all students tested in Kentucky’s annual statewide assessments in 
grades 3-8, was higher in middle grades reading than in non-Appalachian school districts 
(see Table 2.7).  In terms of student growth for students in the lowest quintile of prior 
performance across Kentucky, Appalachian school districts had higher growth for 
mathematics and reading and at both elementary and middle school levels. In terms of 
student growth for students at the highest quintile, however, Appalachian districts had 
lower growth for mathematics at the elementary and middle school levels, and for reading 
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at the elementary level. For middle grades reading, there was no statistically significant 
difference in growth across Appalachian and non-Appalachian districts at conventional 
levels of significance.  
 
Table 2.7 Student Growth in Grades 4-8, Reading and Math 
 
Appalachian 
Districts 
Districts 
Outside 
Appalachia Difference 
Math, Elem -0.293 
(0.006) 
-0.017 
(0.004) 
-0.117 
(0.008) 
Math, Middle 0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Reading, Elem -0.027 
(0.004) 
-0.016 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
Reading, 
Middle 
0.022 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.165*** 
(0.006) 
Prior Achievement Lowest Quintile in State 
Math, Elem 0.423 
(0.009) 
0.359 
(0.007) 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
Math, Middle 0.411 
(0.006) 
0.371 
(0.006) 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
Reading, Elem 0.431 
(0.008) 
0.368 
(0.006) 
0.063*** 
(0.11) 
Reading, 
Middle 
0.373 
(0.008) 
0.313 
(0.074) 
0.061*** 
(0.011) 
Prior Achievement Highest Quintile in State 
Math, Elem -0.344 
(0.009) 
-0.253 
(0.008) 
-0.091*** 
(0.012) 
Math, Middle -0.285 
(0.007) 
-0.220 
(0.006) 
-0.065*** 
(0.010) 
Reading, Elem -0.421 
(0.007) 
-0.353 
(0.007) 
-0.067*** 
(0.010) 
Reading, 
Middle 
-0.310 
(0.009) 
-0.293 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
Average gains in z-scores, 2009 to 2018; *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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2.6 Empirical Strategy 
I use a discrete time duration model to estimate the association between teacher 
mobility and teacher attrition as a function of Appalachian district status, time post-
implementation of the Unbridled Learning reforms, time invariant (Xi) and time varying 
(Ti,t-1) teacher characteristics, district characteristics (Dt), and time. 
Y it = α +  Appalachianitβ1 + Unbridledtβ2+ Xiβ3 + Ti,t-1 β4 + Dt β5 + tδ + μ it 
I estimate the model separately for inter-district mobility and for attrition. Time is 
modeled as a series of dummy variables from 1-10 denoting the period the educator was 
observed in the dataset (e.g. period1 is 1 for the first year observed in the dataset and 
period9 is 1 for the ninth year observed). Given that I have only 10 years of data and only 
a fraction of the educators would be expected to be observed moving or exiting the data, 
this model is more appropriate than the hazard model used in Cowen et al. (2012) which 
covered a longer timeframe of 19 years.  
Time-invariant teacher characteristics Xi will include race/ethnicity (I include 
dummy variables for Black and for Hispanic) and gender (the dummy variable is for 
male). Time-varying factors Ti,t-1 include continuous variables for age and experience, 
dummy variables for rank (Rank I denotes master’s degree plus additional credits, Rank 
II denotes master’s degree, and Rank III denotes bachelor’s degree), school type  
(preschool/primary, elementary, middle, high school, career-technical school), and a 
continuous variable for annual salary inclusive of base salary and additional stipends for 
enhanced roles. Salary has been adjusted to 2018 constant dollars.  All of these factors 
were included in Cowen et al. (2012). For the mobility model, I use age in years. For the 
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attrition model, given hypotheses specific to attrition and the Appalachian region, I 
include age in years, a dummy variable for whether age is less than 28, and an interaction 
variable for age less than 28 and Appalachian.  
In addition to district characteristics included in Cowen et al. (2012) or Fowles et 
al. (2013) – students per teacher, population and population density, enrollment, median 
household income (in 2018 constant dollars), and student population factors – I include a 
wider array of covariates: 
• Student achievement (standardized z scores for grades 3-8) and growth (z-
score gain scores for grades 4-8). Given high correlations between reading 
and mathematics results, and between reading results and other variables 
such as the percent of students eligible for free and reduced lunch, only 
mathematics results were used in the models. 
• Working conditions: Composite results from the TELL Working 
Conditions Survey administered in 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, with a 1-4 
scale, with 4 the most favorable. Given high correlations among construct-
level results and between several construct-level results and other district-
level variables (e.g. Community Support construct and percent of students 
eligible for free and reduced lunch), the composite results were used. 
• Rurality: District-level degree of rurality – fringe, distant, or remote. 
Finally, I run alternative specifications using different regional configurations, 
including Local Workforce Area (model 2) and Educational Cooperative (model 3). 
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2.7 Results  
2.7.1 Mobility 
From model 1, results suggest that with all other variables held constant, teachers in 
Appalachian districts are less likely to make cross-district moves than teachers in districts 
outside of Appalachia. They also suggest that teachers are more likely to make cross-
district moves following the Unbridled Learning reforms. This is consistent with results 
from Cowen et al. (2012), which found that teachers in Appalachia were less likely to 
move across districts and that all teachers were more likely to make cross-district moves 
following KERA. These results were reinforced with Model 2, which found that, all else 
held constant, lower rates of mobility were observed in the Cumberlands and EKCEP 
LWA’s; and in Model 3, which found lower rates of mobility in the KVEC and SESC 
educational cooperatives (Table 2.8). It is interesting, however, and worthy of further 
exploration that the Northern Kentucky LWA has lower mobility than the Bluegrass 
LWA, given the number and proximity of districts in the Northern Kentucky region. 
For teacher characteristics covariates, all other variables held constant, mobility 
was more likely for male teachers and less likely for Black teachers. More years of 
experience and higher age slightly reduces the association with mobility across districts. 
Additional salary reduces the association with mobility, as does attaining certification as 
Rank I.  
For district characteristics, other variables held constant, and as compared to all 
other location types, teaching in a rural fringe or rural distant school district has an 
association with higher mobility, which is notable as it is in the opposite direction as the 
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Appalachian place variable. Higher ratings on the TELL Working Conditions Survey 
across all constructs is associated with lower mobility from those districts. Student 
achievement in middle grades mathematics at the district level is associated with lower 
mobility from those districts, while higher levels of growth in middle grades mathematics 
is associated with higher mobility. Teaching in a district with a higher proportion of 
white students is associated with lower mobility from those districts, while teaching in a 
district with a higher proportion of students eligible for free and reduced lunch is 
associated with higher rates of moves to other districts. 
Table 2.8 Empirical Results, Cross-District Mobility  
Mobility 
Model 1: 
Appalachian Model 2: LWA Model 3: COOP 
Appalachian  -0.240*** 
(0.043) 
  
LWA  
(Bluegrass reference) 
   
Lincoln Trail  
-0.236*** 
(0.054) 
 
Tenco  
-0.204*** 
(0.061) 
 
Green River  
-0.284*** 
(0.061) 
 
West Kentucky  
-0.162*** 
(0.052) 
 
Cumberlands  
-0.823*** 
(0.073) 
 
South Central  
-0.209*** 
(0.059) 
 
Kentuckiana Works  
-0.119* 
(0.058) 
 
EKCEP  
-0.677*** 
(0.065) 
 
Northern Kentucky  
-0.118* 
(0.053) 
 
COOP  
(CKEC reference) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
GRREC   
-0.456*** 
(0.045) 
KEDC   
-0.539*** 
(0.063) 
KVEC   
-0.765*** 
(0.082) 
NKCES   
-0.284*** 
(0.059) 
OVEC   
-0.198*** 
(0.054) 
SESC   
-0.741*** 
(0.061) 
WKEC   
-0.281*** 
(0.053) 
JEFFCO   
0.222 
(0.193) 
Policy    
Unbridled Learning 
Reforms 
0.352*** 
(0.047) 
0.343*** 
(0.047) 
0.319*** 
(0.047) 
Teacher 
Characteristics 
   
Male 0.318*** 
(0.030) 
0.326*** 
(0.030) 
0.323*** 
(0.030) 
Black -0.218* 
(0.092) 
-0.218* 
(0.092) 
-0.224* 
(0.092) 
Hispanic 0.040 
(0.099) 
0.099 
(0.099) 
0.079 
(0.099) 
Experience -0.054*** 
(0.004) 
-0.054*** 
(0.004) 
-0.054*** 
(0.004) 
Age -0.030*** 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.002) 
Annual Salary 
($1,000’s 2018) 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
Credentials     
Rank I 
0.836** 
(0.312) 
0.840** 
(0.314) 
0.800** 
(0.315) 
Rank II 
0.511 
(0.310) 
0.492 
(0.312) 
0.470 
(0.313) 
Rank III 
0.286 
(0.309) 
0.272 
(0.310) 
0.260 
(0.312) 
Teaching level     
Preschool/primary 
-0.535 
(0.292) 
-0.578* 
(0.292) 
-0.580* 
(0.292) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
Elementary 
-0.263 
(0.267) 
-0.267 
(0.267) 
-0.212 
(0.268) 
Middle 
0.145 
(0.267) 
0.130 
(0.268) 
0.187 
(0.268) 
High 
0.214 
(0.266) 
0.200 
(0.268) 
0.251 
(0.268) 
CTE 
-0.009 
(0.287) 
-0.015 
(0.288) 
-0.028 
(0.288) 
District 
Characteristics 
   
Rural fringe 
0.139*** 
(0.038) 
0.098* 
(0.041) 
0.138*** 
(0.038) 
Rural distant 
0.105** 
(0.038) 
0.095* 
(0.041) 
0.122*** 
(0.040) 
Rural remote 
0.038 
(0.060) 
0.096 
(0.063) 
0.019 
(0.061) 
Population density 
(1,000 per sq.mile) 
-0.032*** 
(0.016) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
Total population  
(1,000’s) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Median household 
income ($1,000’s in 
2018) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Interstate runs 
through district 
0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.026 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
White students -1.004*** 
(0.141) 
-0.868*** 
(0.158) 
-0.895*** 
(0.167) 
Free-reduced lunch 
students 
0.440** 
(0.165) 
0.823** 
(0.175) 
0.516*** 
(0.164) 
Student-teacher ratio -0.028*** 
(0.008) 
-0.022*** 
(0.009) 
-0.021* 
(0.009) 
Working conditions 
composite 
-0.710*** 
(0.106) 
-0.513*** 
(0.111) 
-0.315*** 
(0.112) 
Student achievement    
Elementary math 0.003 
(0.095) 
0.048 
(0.097) 
-0.162 
(0.097) 
Middle math -0.392*** 
(0.103) 
-0.286** 
(0.108) 
-0.258* 
(0.109) 
Student growth    
Elementary math -0.099 
(0.114) 
-0.119 
(0.117) 
0.145 
(0.116) 
Middle math 0.398** 
(0.141) 
0.438*** 
(0.146) 
0.430*** 
(0.144) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
Time     
Year 2 -0.153*** 
(0.043) 
-0.152*** 
(0.043) 
-0.152*** 
(0.043) 
Year 3 -0.413*** 
(0.046) 
-0.415*** 
(0.046) 
-0.413*** 
(0.046) 
Year 4 -0.685*** 
(0.051) 
-0.679*** 
(0.051) 
-0.663*** 
(0.051) 
Year 5 -0.587*** 
(0.055) 
-0.586*** 
(0.055) 
-0.579*** 
(0.055) 
Year 6 -0.444*** 
(0.056) 
-0.446*** 
(0.056) 
-0.440*** 
(0.056) 
Year 7 -0.389*** 
(0.063) 
-0.412*** 
(0.063) 
-0.412*** 
(0.063) 
Year 8 -0.386*** 
(0.067) 
-0.414*** 
(0.068) 
-0.407*** 
(0.068) 
Year 9 -0.391*** 
(0.074) 
-0.423*** 
(0.075) 
-0.417*** 
(0.075) 
Constant 1.51 
(0.569) 
0.833 
(0.587) 
0.526 
(0.603) 
n 261,259 
observations 
Standard errors 
adjusted by 55,200 
teacher clusters  
261,259 
observations 
Standard errors 
adjusted by 55,200 
teacher clusters  
261,259 
observations 
Standard errors 
adjusted by 55,020 
teacher clusters  
***= p<0.001, **= p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
2.7.2 Attrition 
In contrast to results from Cowen et al. (2012), which found that teachers in 
Appalachian districts were more likely to exit the profession, in Model 1, I find that 
teachers in Appalachian districts, all else held constant, were less likely than teachers in 
districts outside of Appalachia to leave teaching in Kentucky’s public school districts. 
The alternative regional specification in Model 2 suggests a meaningful and significant 
association between the Cumberlands LWA, which is mostly counties in Appalachia, and 
lower rates of attrition. In Model 3, a weak association does exist between lower rates of 
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attrition and the SESC, which largely overlaps with the Appalachian region, and GRREC, 
which includes a few Appalachian counties.  
Like results from the earlier period following KERA, all other variables held 
constant, higher rates of attrition from the profession are associated with the period 
following a statewide education reform, in this case the Unbridled Learning reforms in 
2012.  
In terms of teacher characteristics, Hispanic teachers more likely to leave the 
profession. In model 1, the interaction between teachers less than 28 years old and 
teaching in an Appalachian district was significant at conventional levels, confirming my 
expectation. Of teaching credentials, Rank I teachers have the lowest likelihood of 
leaving the profession. There is a positive association between attrition and teaching in 
middle school, high school, and CTE schools.  
In terms of district characteristics, districts that contain an interstate highway, all 
other variables held constant, have higher rates of attrition, while districts with more 
white students have lower rates of attrition. Higher ratings on the TELL Working 
Conditions Survey are associated with lower attrition, while higher levels of student 
growth in elementary mathematics are associated with higher attrition from the 
profession. 
Table 2.9 Attrition, Classroom Teachers 
Attrition Model 1: 
Appalachian Model 2: LWA Model 3: COOP 
Appalachian  -0.124** 
(0.046) 
  
LWA  
(Bluegrass reference) 
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Table 2.9 (continued) 
Lincoln Trail  
-0.042 
(0.062) 
 
Tenco  
0.094 
(0.072) 
 
Green River  
0.014 
(0.065) 
 
West Kentucky  
0.130* 
(0.054) 
 
Cumberlands  
-0.244*** 
(0.077) 
 
South Central  
-0.009 
(0.068) 
 
Kentuckiana Works  
0.178** 
(0.066) 
 
EKCEP  
0.067 
(0.069) 
 
Northern Kentucky  
0.153** 
(0.057) 
 
COOP  
(CKEC reference) 
   
GRREC   
-0.123* 
(0.053) 
KEDC   
-0.017 
(0.072) 
KVEC   
0.072 
(0.084) 
NKCES   
0.070 
(0.063) 
OVEC   
0.100 
(0.065) 
SESC   
-0.144* 
(0.067) 
WKEC   
0.122* 
(0.058) 
JEFFCO   
0.106 
(0.193) 
Policy     
Unbridled Learning 
Reforms 
0.273*** 
(0.043) 
0.272*** 
(0.043) 
0.266*** 
(0.043) 
Teacher 
Characteristics 
   
Male -0.038 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.030) 
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Table 2.9 (continued) 
Black -0.068 
(0.063) 
-0.068 
(0.063) 
-0.067 
(0.063) 
Hispanic 0.316*** 
(0.080) 
0.311*** 
(0.080) 
0.313*** 
(0.080) 
Experience -0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Age Less than 28 -0.210*** 
(0.045) 
-0.178*** 
(0.042) 
-0.179*** 
(0.042) 
Age Less than 28 x 
Appalachian 
0.154* 
(0.079) 
  
Annual Salary (2018 
$1,000’s) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Credentials     
Rank I 
-1.24*** 
(0.181) 
-1.24*** 
(0.162) 
-1.24*** 
(0.162) 
Rank II 
-1.07*** 
(0.158) 
-1.07*** 
(0.159) 
-1.08*** 
(0.159) 
Rank III 
-0.822*** 
(0.157) 
-0.828*** 
(0.158) 
-0.829*** 
(0.158) 
School type     
Preschool/primary 
0.129 
(0.149) 
0.238 
(0.183) 
0.217 
(0.183) 
Elementary 
0.129 
(0.149) 
0.131 
(0.149) 
0.137 
(0.149) 
Middle 
0.339* 
(0.149) 
0.341* 
(0.149) 
0.348* 
(0.149) 
High 
0.416*** 
(0.149) 
0.416*** 
(0.149) 
0.420*** 
(0.149) 
CTE 
0.430* 
(0.182) 
0.450* 
(0.183) 
0.431* 
(0.183) 
District 
Characteristics 
   
Rural teaching     
Rural Fringe 
-0.091 
(0.048) 
-0.091 
(0.048) 
-0.056 
(0.045) 
Rural Distant 
0.024 
(0.047) 
0.024 
(0.047) 
0.012 
(0.047) 
Rural Remote 
0.000 
(0.068) 
0.000 
(0.068) 
0.021 
(0.069) 
Population density 
(1,000 per sq.mile) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.020) 
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Table 2.9 (continued) 
Total population  -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.003) 
Median household 
income (1,000’s 
2018$) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
Interstate runs 
through district 
0.123*** 
(0.035) 
0.073*** 
(0.036) 
0.071*** 
(0.037) 
White students -0.786*** 
(0.151) 
-1.07*** 
(0.170) 
-0.961*** 
(0.189) 
Free-reduced lunch 
students 
0.261 
(0.174) 
0.351 
(0.180) 
0.204 
(0.174) 
Student-teacher ratio -0.015 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Working conditions 
composite 
-0.420*** 
(0.182) 
-0.470*** 
(0.128) 
-0.373*** 
(0.129) 
Student achievement    
Elementary math -0.083 
(0.107) 
-0.073 
(0.109) 
-0.150 
(0.109) 
Middle math -0.123 
(0.104) 
-0.071 
(0.114) 
-0.104 
(0.121) 
Student growth    
Elementary math 0.432*** 
(0.132) 
0.479*** 
(0.133) 
0.458*** 
(0.133) 
Middle math 0.126 
(0.152) 
0.039 
(0.158) 
0.084 
(0.159) 
Time     
Year 2 -0.214*** 
(0.042) 
-0.215*** 
(0.042) 
-0.214*** 
(0.042) 
Year 3 -0.689*** 
(0.048) 
-0.690*** 
(0.048) 
-0.689*** 
(0.048) 
Year 4 -0.940*** 
(0.050) 
-0.942*** 
(0.050) 
-0.937*** 
(0.050) 
Year 5 -0.974*** 
(0.055) 
-0.999*** 
(0.055) 
-1.00*** 
(0.055) 
Year 6 -1.08*** 
(0.059) 
-1.10*** 
(0.059) 
-1.10*** 
(0.059) 
Year 7 -1.14*** 
(0.066) 
-1.10*** 
(0.066) 
-1.10*** 
(0.066) 
Constant 0.023 
(0.514) 
0.72 
(0.499) 
0.432 
(0.532) 
n 202,200 
observations 
adjusted for 54,314 
teacher clusters 
202,200 
observations 
adjusted for 54,314 
teacher clusters 
202,200 
observations 
adjusted for 54,314 
teacher clusters 
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2.8 Discussion 
The results from descriptive and empirical analyses support the expectation that 
Appalachian status would have a negative relationship to classroom teacher cross-district 
mobility, and these results are also consistent with those found in the earlier period from 
1986-2005. The results also support the expectation for an association between higher 
attrition among Appalachian teachers less than 28 and lower attrition for Appalachian 
teachers overall. These results are different than those found in the earlier time period, 
which found that Appalachian status was related to higher likelihood of exits from the 
dataset. It is possible that my definition of attrition, or “leaver” events, is inconsistent 
with the definition used in the earlier analysis – my definition may be more likely to code 
exits from the dataset as retirements. In fact, I find that using my criteria for a “leaver” 
event being a likely retirement (experience of at least 27 years, or age 60 with at least 6 
years of experience), teachers in Appalachia retire at an earlier average age (57.7) than 
teachers in districts outside Appalachia (59.2). It is possible that the earlier analysis 
included some exits that I would have coded as likely retirements. It is also possible that 
the conditions in the more recent time-period, such as diminishing alternative career 
options in Appalachia, led to lower likelihood of attrition. 
My expectation was that the Unbridled Learning reforms would not have an 
association with higher or lower rates of mobility or attrition; yet, in both analyses, the 
time-period following the reforms was associated with higher likelihood of teachers 
making cross-district moves and leaving public school districts in Kentucky. For 
mobility, the descriptive analysis indicates a longer-term trend of increasing mobility 
across the years, even increasing in 2017 and 2018 when many of the reforms had been 
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dismantled. It is not clear what could be driving this trend. It is possible, however, that 
the reform had an influence on teacher attrition – a spike in the number of teacher exits 
occurred in 2011 and 2012, the year prior to and year of implementation of the new 
standards, assessments, and accountability system, and at the beginning of the pilot phase 
of the new teacher evaluation system. 
These analyses include covariates for rural school district environments, 
differentiating between rural fringe, rural distant, and rural remote districts. They suggest 
that teachers in rural fringe districts are more likely to move across districts, all else 
constant, while teachers in rural fringe and rural distant districts are more likely to leave 
the profession.  
Previous work has found that teacher perceptions of working conditions play a role 
in teacher mobility and attrition (or if not differentiated, teacher turnover). For example, 
Kukla-Acevedo (2009) finds that student behavior is a driver of mobility for less 
experienced teachers, and the meta-analysis from Nguyen et al. (2019) finds a 
relationship between administrative support and reduced mobility. The results in these 
analyses for working conditions reinforce evidence that at the composite level, other 
variables held constant, teacher perceptions of working conditions are associated with 
lower rates of mobility and lower rates of attrition.   
Finally, some evidence from previous literature has suggested that teachers are 
more likely to move to schools with higher achievement and higher proportions of white 
students and lower proportions of economically disadvantaged students (Hanushek et al., 
2004), although the meta-analysis from Nguyen et al. (2019) did not find an association 
for student population factors. At the district level, I find that teachers are less likely to 
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move or leave the profession from districts with higher proportions of white students, 
other variables held constant. The results for district-level achievement and student 
growth, which both factor into school and district accountability ratings, need further 
exploration – as middle grades mathematics achievement and growth are associated with 
mobility in opposite directions, and elementary grades mathematics growth is associated 
with higher attrition from the profession.  
In future work, I will further explore these issues by examining cross-district and 
within-district mobility, as well as attrition, using school-level characteristics such as 
student population, working conditions, and student achievement and growth that vary 
within districts. I will also explore bringing in a wider array of variables to capture 
community amenities, such as access to health care. 
2.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I find that teachers in Appalachian districts have several distinct 
characteristics from teachers outside Appalachia. For example, they are more likely to 
have more years of experience, age, and more likely to attain the highest level of 
certification in Kentucky. They are less likely to move their employment across districts 
and to leave the profession prior to retirement; they are, however, more likely to retire at 
an earlier age.  They have significantly lower salaries than teachers outside Appalachia, 
and since 2009, the purchasing power of those salaries has been decreasing at a faster 
pace than salaries in districts outside Appalachia.  In future work, in addition to 
enhancing the empirical analyses with an examination of within-district (school to 
school) mobility and school-level variables for working conditions and student 
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achievement and growth, I will consider differences between mobility to and from 
districts on the border of Appalachia, as in Cowen et al. (2012). I also hope to incorporate 
sufficient data on teachers’ undergraduate institution and subject area taught. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. EDUCATOR CAREER PATHWAYS 
3.1 Introduction 
In decade following the Great Recession of 2008, districts across Kentucky 
increased the number of certified educators in roles other than classroom teacher. This 
shift could relate to changes in demand brought on by the implementation of the 
Unbridled Learning reforms in 2012 as a response to new priorities among school district 
and school leaders – for example, leaders may have traded higher class sizes for the 
ability to have a certified educator in a flexible role to contribute to standards and 
assessment transitions, assistance to the evaluation processes, or data analysis in 
alignment to new accountability metrics. It could also be in response to changes in supply 
– teachers could see these roles as attractive attributes and seek out districts that increase 
these roles. As this chapter demonstrates, the growth in these kinds of roles was not 
equally distributed across the Appalachian region and districts outside of Appalachia, 
with the Appalachian region seeing less of an increase in these roles. These numbers 
quantify the stories of young teachers in Appalachia moving outside the region, even to 
other states such as Tennessee, that offer more leadership opportunities to early career 
educators.  
As compared to other professions, classroom teachers have little opportunity to 
move up a career ladder or pathway as they gain experience, expertise, and demonstrate 
their degree of effectiveness. In the context of most school districts that standardize 
teacher salaries in “step and lane” salary schedules based on years of experience and 
education level (Grissom & Strunk, 2012), they can increase their salary only by accruing 
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years of experience, by attaining higher levels of education, or by taking on extra 
responsibilities that districts compensate with an extra stipend. Teachers can also move to 
districts with higher salaries for the same education and experience level. In most cases, 
teachers who wish to take on more responsibility and higher salaries must pursue an 
administrative pathway that leads to a school principal position or a position at a school 
district office. These administrative positions, however, are limited in number and may 
not be attractive to teachers who prefer to apply experience and expertise in instruction 
and curriculum closer to the classroom.  
For over 40 years, states and school districts have struggled to craft career ladders 
or career pathways for educators that allow them to increase responsibility and base 
salary yet stay in the classroom. These systems have often emerged in parallel to educator 
evaluation systems and merit pay systems. In the 1980’s, Tennessee’s Career Ladder 
system under then-Governor Lamar Alexander was an early example; Denver’s ProComp 
system was one of the only examples of a system that separated from the traditional step 
and lane salary schedule; and today’s DC Impact system in District of Columbia Public 
Schools has provided teachers with opportunities to have higher base salary and take on 
responsibilities while staying in the classroom. 
Another way to give certified teachers more career options is to diversify educator 
roles. Adding roles such as instructional coaches, assessment consultants, and reading or 
math specialists gives teachers opportunities to earn salaries that are not set by the salary 
schedule and to take on different responsibilities, which could prevent or address burnout. 
From the supply side, these roles could affect teacher recruitment and retention: 
anticipating the future, teachers may prefer to accept a position and stay in a district or 
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school that has a higher diversity of roles. From the demand side, these roles could be 
used to retain a teacher who has favorable characteristics or attributes (e.g. expertise, 
demonstrated effectiveness, “fit” with the school, goal alignment, strong relationships 
with administrators, parents, or the community) but who might otherwise transfer to a 
different school or district. These roles could also be in demand from administrators 
during more intense periods of policy change that affect educator workloads, such as 
implementation of new standards and assessments, or a new evaluation system.  
Working with New York state data, Brewer (1996) focused on educator career 
pathways from the supply side, exploring the relationship between educator quit 
decisions and opportunities for teachers to rise into positions such as these. Using a 
hazard model, he finds some evidence of such a relationship. Some of the study’s most 
valuable insights, however, come from descriptive analyses which deepen understanding 
of educator career pathways.  
In this chapter, I leverage a longitudinal a dataset of all certified educators in 
Kentucky from 2009 to 2018 to support descriptive analyses, including analyses of 
annualized data to show staffing trends over time and longitudinal data to illuminate 
common career pathways. Both analyses differentiate staffing trends and pathways by 
region (inside and outside Appalachia).  
3.2 Motivation 
From 2009 to 2018, Kentucky school districts increased the number of higher-
paying, higher-responsibility positions, such as school-based instructional consultants and 
school administrators, that could be attractive to classroom teachers. Even Appalachian 
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school districts, which experienced an overall decline in student enrollment and a 
decrease in over 1,000 teaching positions during this time, increased the number of these 
positions by more than 50.  
Providing educators opportunities to progress along a career pathway may relate 
to lower rates mobility and attrition. Educators may be less likely to move between 
districts or leave the profession if they perceive future advancement opportunities. The 
2012-13 Teacher Follow Up Survey from the NCES Schools and Staffing Survey, for 
example, found that 48.9 percent of teachers who left teaching reported that opportunities 
for promotion were higher in their new job, while 33.6 percent found that they were no 
better or worse. If so, we need to better understand staffing patterns and how they vary 
across districts – the extent to which educators can access positions with higher salaries 
and responsibilities across districts with different characteristics, including economically 
distressed, geographically-isolated areas such as Appalachia. We also need to better 
understand career pathways themselves – the characteristics of those who stay in 
classrooms and those who take higher-paying and higher-responsibility positions – and 
how they vary across regions.  
Research questions: 
• What are the patterns of initial placement of teachers from institutions of 
higher education into school districts, inside and outside of Appalachia? 
• How have staffing patterns for certified educators changed over time? 
How do they differ across regions? 
• What are the characteristics of typical educator career pathways – what 
percentage of teachers stay in classroom teacher roles, what percentage 
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move into higher-paying, higher-responsibility roles and what are their 
characteristics (e.g. age, gender)? How do pathways look different, if at 
all, for Appalachian educators and non-Appalachian educators? 
• How do retirement patterns vary across Appalachian and non-Appalachian 
districts? 
3.3 Literature Review 
Little empirical literature exists on educator career pathways. Although studies 
such as Fowles et al. (2013) illuminate factors that drive teacher’s initial placement into 
school districts, and an array of literature addresses mobility and attrition, few studies 
have examined transitions between educator roles. Using longitudinal survey of graduates 
from an urban education preparation program in Los Angeles over an eight-year period, 
Quartz et al. (2008) found 57 unique career pathways in addition to the most likely 
pathway – 68 percent of educators stayed as full time teachers throughout the study time-
period. Brewer (1996), working with 10 years of data in New York state, focuses on the 
question of whether opportunities for teachers to move up a career ladder influence their 
decisions to leave the profession. Are they less likely to leave and seek employment 
outside public school teaching if they have an opportunity to move up the ladder? After 
valuable descriptive analyses that indicate that male teachers are far more likely to 
transition to higher-paying, higher-responsibility positions in school administration, and 
after quantifying the substantial salary differentials for doing so, he employs a hazard 
model of quit decisions to examine the relationship to the attractiveness and availability 
of promotion opportunities. This study finds limited evidence using these measures, but 
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does find that teachers’ quit decisions relate to own salary and to alternative salaries 
outside of education within the county.  
Initial labor market supply decisions among educators about where to begin 
teaching and demand decisions such as district teacher hiring practices influence 
variation in teacher quality across school districts. Research in Michigan suggests that 
social capital networks may play a role in student teaching assignments and initial teacher 
placements, with students from rural areas less represented in public universities with 
strong relationships with school districts (Maier & Youngs, 2009). In examining the 
Appalachian context, Fowles et al. (2013) suggests that although most teachers stay in the 
region in which they were prepared (within or outside Appalachia), teachers with the 
highest ACT scores and teacher certification exam scores who are prepared in 
postsecondary institutions in Appalachia are more likely to take their initial placement 
outside of Appalachia. Human resource policies and practices such as hiring cycles can 
also affect teacher labor markets (Papay & Kraft, 2016). In some school districts and 
schools, established recruitment strategies, early awareness of future vacancies, 
partnerships with educator preparation programs, and efficient human resource operations 
promote early offers of employment, increasing the chances that schools can hire 
preferred candidates. In contrast, some school districts and schools without these policy 
and management benefits may end up with late offers of employment, when preferred 
candidates may have already accepted positions. Some schools even begin academic 
years with numerous vacancies left to be filled.  
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3.4 Conceptual Framework 
Promoting teachers to higher-paying, higher-responsibility roles may retain 
educators who may otherwise be at greater risk of switching districts or leaving the 
teaching profession. Evidence suggests that opportunities for career advancement 
enhances job satisfaction among nurses (Lu, Barriball, Zhang, & While, 2012) as well as 
public and private sector employees more generally (DeSantis & Durst, 1996; Moynihan 
& Pandey, 2007). From a demand side, this strategy may pay off for districts in returns to 
student performance outcomes under certain conditions. For example, student 
achievement may increase if the promoted educator is effective and reaches more 
students through the new role, and if he or she is replaced in the classroom with a teacher 
of equal or greater effectiveness. Some evidence has been found for strategic staffing 
decisions, including finding ways to expand the reach of effective teachers. Barrett and 
Toma (2013), for example, find that administrators “reward” more effective teachers with 
larger class sizes. Yet it is far from certain that these conditions are met in “rewarding” 
teachers with these new roles – it may be that leaders promote teachers into these roles 
because they are ineffective in the classroom, or because they have other characteristics 
or attributes that do not relate to expertise or effectiveness.  
Policy may also influence these staffing decisions. Implementation of a standards-
based reform such as Unbridled Learning may encourage districts to open up more 
positions such as instructional consultants to oversee shifts in standards and assessments, 
and implementation of human capital reforms such as teacher evaluation systems may 
encourage districts to increase the number of school administrator positions to handle 
higher evaluation workloads. Federal funding incentives may also play a role. 
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Place may play a role as well, although the direction is not certain. From a supply 
side, this strategy may be less appealing if teachers have less propensity to move districts 
and if salaries outside of education are less attractive. For example, Streams et al. (2013) 
suggests that teaching would be an attractive career option for individuals with high 
attachment to place – those who want to “stay local” – in areas with little occupational 
diversity such as in Appalachia. The study also shows that of comparable professions – 
physical therapists, registered nurses, and accountants – teaching has comparable or 
higher wages to registered nurses and accountants. However, it is possible that in areas 
with declining student enrollments, pressure to increase class sizes due to fiscal 
constraints, and low employment opportunities outside of the local school system, 
instructional consultant positions and school administrator positions may be ways to 
provide stable employment in the community. 
3.5 Data  
The dataset includes data elements at the individual level for all certified 
educators working in Kentucky’s public school districts. The data have been made 
available for research and evaluation through a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Kentucky Center for Statistics and the Kentucky Department of Education. The Kentucky 
Center for Statistics supplied individual data with unique id’s specific to this project to 
facilitate longitudinal analyses while protecting against disclosure of personally-
identifiable information. Educator data draws in part from Kentucky’s MUNIS database 
of certified educators, which includes 110 regular job classification codes and 37 extra 
duty job classification codes. I have coded each of the regular job classification codes 
63 
 
into seven categories to simplify analyses: classroom teacher, school-based instructional 
consultants (e.g. math consultants, exceptional child consultants), school administrators 
(e.g. assistant principals and deans of students), school principals, district administrators, 
district superintendents, and school-based specialists (e.g. librarians, counselors, speech 
pathologists). Stipends tied to extra duty job classification codes have been combined 
with the salaries for educators’ regular job classification code to create a total salary 
variable. This variable has also been adjusted to 2018 current dollars.  
3.6 Staffing Patterns  
Between 2009 and 2018, Kentucky school districts employed an increasing 
number of school-based instructional consultants (e.g. reading specialists, curriculum 
consultants, mathematics coaches) and school administrators (e.g. assistant principals, 
student deans). By 2018, districts outside Appalachia, which have 2.5 times the number 
of students as districts outside Appalachia, added 317 new instructional consultant 
positions – ultimately employing 6.5 times the number of instructional consultants as 
districts in Appalachia (Table 3.1). These districts added more instructional consultant 
positions than classroom teachers (191). Even in Appalachian districts, which lost 1,173 
classroom teaching positions over this time-period, districts added 20 instructional 
consultant positions. A similar pattern emerges for school administrators, with 
Appalachian districts staffing 34 new school administrator positions. Appalachian 
districts employed 30 fewer school principals by 2018 – perhaps due to school closures – 
and perhaps these principals moved into school administrator positions in other schools. 
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For other roles, the pattern inside and outside of Appalachia diverged between 
2009 and 2018. Appalachian school districts decreased the number of district 
administrators by 52, while districts outside Appalachia increased the number of these 
positions by 118. Appalachian districts employed 121 fewer school-based specialists such 
as librarians, speech pathologists, and school counselors, while districts outside 
Appalachia employed 161 additional specialist positions.  
Table 3.1 Certified Educator Staffing, 2009 and 2018, by Appalachian Status 
 2009 2018 
Percent 
Change 
Classroom Teachers    
Appalachian Districts 12,937 11,775 -9.0 
Districts Outside Appalachia 29,803 30,016 0.7 
Kentucky Total 42,740 41,791 -2.2 
    
Instructional Coaches    
Appalachian Districts 106 126 18.9 
Districts Outside Appalachia 500 813 62.6 
Kentucky Total 606 939 54.9 
    
School Administrators    
Appalachian Districts 235 267 13.6 
Districts Outside Appalachia 626 912 45.7 
Kentucky Total 861 1179 36.9 
    
School-Based Specialists     
Appalachian Districts 1,207 1,087 -9.9 
Districts Outside Appalachia 2,708 2,881 6.4 
Kentucky Total 3,915 3,968 1.3 
    
District Administrators    
Appalachian Districts 375 324 -13.6 
Districts Outside Appalachia 555 676 21.8 
Kentucky Total 930 1000 7.5 
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3.7 Initial Placement  
Analysis of placement of teachers from educator preparation programs (EPPs) 
reinforces the finding that Appalachia is a relatively fixed, isolated teacher labor market. 
I have matched a sample of young, novice classroom teachers in the 2018 academic year 
to Kentucky public and independent educator preparation programs from which they 
completed teacher certification. I have restricted the sample to teachers to those with less 
than two years of experience, less than 26 years of age, and a Rank III (bachelor’s 
degree). For this sample of 1536 teachers, I have matched 1460 (95 percent) to their EPP. 
Of this subset of teachers who received certification from educator preparation programs 
in Appalachia (503), 61.2 percent were teaching in an Appalachian school district (see 
Table 3.2). Of the 957 teachers from educator preparation programs in colleges and 
universities outside of Appalachia, 92.9 percent stayed in districts outside of Appalachia 
and 7.1 percent taught in an Appalachian school district.  
Table 3.2 Percentage of Novice Rank III Teachers less than 26 Years of Age in 
Appalachian or Non-Appalachian Districts, by EPP Region (2018) 
 
Appalachian 
EPP 
Non-
Appalachian 
EPP 
Appalachian Districts 61.2 7.1 
Districts Outside Appalachia 38.8 92.9 
 
External validity for this analysis, however, is limited due to 1) restrictions on the sample 
itself to young teachers (age less than 26) with a Rank III in their first and second year in 
Kentucky public schools, and 2) differences between matched and unmatched teachers. 
Restricting the sample to these factors excludes older teachers who are new to teaching as 
well as those who enter with or quickly attain a master’s degree (Rank II). I chose the age 
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cut-off for consistency with the next analysis that tracks students back to high school, but 
results do not change in a meaningful way by including teachers who are less than 30 
years old. In that case, a full sample of 2,282 nets a match of 2,138 teachers (94 percent 
match rate) and the percentage of teachers in Appalachian districts who completed EPP’s 
in Appalachia increases slightly to 62.3 percent (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3 Percentage of Novice Rank III Teachers less than 30 Years of Age in 
Appalachian or Non-Appalachian Districts, by EPP Region (2018) 
 
Appalachian 
EPP 
Non-
Appalachian 
EPP 
Appalachian Districts 62.3 7.1 
Districts Outside Appalachia 37.7 92.9 
 
I chose to restrict to Rank III teachers for the primary analysis because they are the most 
typical among younger, novice teachers. The results, however, vary a bit by considering 
only Rank II teachers of age less than 30. Of a sample of 361 teachers, I matched 342 for 
a rate of 95 percent. The major difference in that case is that teachers from Appalachian 
EPP’s are slightly more likely to teach outside of Appalachia (Table 3.4). It is possible 
that this is a function of online initial certification, graduate degree programs at 
Appalachian universities, such as University of the Cumberlands. 
Table 3.4 Percentage of Novice Rank II Teachers less than 30 Years of Age in 
Appalachian or Non-Appalachian Districts, by Education Preparation Program 
Region (2018) 
 
Appalachian 
EPP 
Non-
Appalachian 
EPP 
Appalachian Districts 37.1 7.6 
Districts Outside Appalachia 62.1 92.4 
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The second potential threat to external validity comes from differences between the 
matched and non-matched populations. Going back to the primary analysis for Rank III 
teachers less than 26 years old with one or two years of experience, some similarities and 
differences emerge (see Table 3.5). Of the 76 teachers whose EPP could not be matched, 
they were less likely to be teaching in a rural school district, more likely to teach in a 
district with an interstate, and with lower median household income. 
Table 3.5 Difference in Means, Teachers Matched and Not Matched to EPP – 
Rank III, Age Less than 26, Experience Less than 2 Years (2018) 
 Matched 
Not 
Matched Difference 
Teaching in Appalachia 25.7 18.4 7.3 
Teaching in a Rural District 30.7 10.5 20.1*** 
Female  84.0 82.9 1.1 
Interstate  63.6 81.6 17.9** 
Median Household Income  $52,141 $55,735 -$3,594* 
High School Teaching  23.5 28.0 4.4 
N 1460 76  
       ***= p<0.001, **= p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
 
 This pattern can also be observed when tracking teachers back to their own high 
school in Kentucky. With a sample of 1460 teachers with less than two years of 
experience, who are less than 26 years of age, with a Rank III in the 2018 academic year, 
I matched 1173 (80 percent) to a Kentucky high school graduation record. Within this 
sample, for teachers who graduated from a high school in Appalachia, 71.4 percent 
attended an Appalachian educator preparation program and taught in Appalachia in their 
first two years. (Table 3.6). Of first and second year teachers in 2018 who graduated from 
a high school outside of Appalachia, 76.2 percent stayed outside of Appalachia for their 
educator preparation program and for their first-year placement. 
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Table 3.6 Teaching in an Appalachian District, by EPP and High School 
Graduation Region (2018) 
 
Appalachian 
High School 
Non-
Appalachian 
High School 
Appalachian District   
   Appalachian EPP 71.4 9.8 
   Non-Appalachian EPP 12.8 6.0 
District Outside 
Appalachia 
  
   Appalachian EPP 5.1 14.6 
   Non-Appalachian EPP 4.1 76.2 
 
The matched and non-matched populations do differ in several ways. The unmatched 
population – those who do not have a graduation record from a public high school in 
Kentucky – is more likely to be teaching outside Appalachia, in a district with an 
interstate running through it, in a district with a higher median household income, and in 
a non-rural district (see Table 3.7). It is possible that this population is more likely to 
have attended high school outside Kentucky or graduated from a private high school.  
Table 3.7 Difference in Means, Teachers Matched and Not Matched to High 
School Graduation – Rank III, Age Less than 26, Experience Less than 2 Years 
(2018) 
 Matched 
Not 
Matched Difference 
Teaching in Appalachia 28.6 13.9 14.7*** 
Teaching in a Rural District 33.8 17.7 16.0*** 
Female  83.1 87.9 -4.8* 
Interstate  62.0 70.4 -8.5** 
Median Household Income  $51,165 $56,133 -$4,968*** 
High School Teaching  22.8 26.6 -4.0 
N 1173 287  
       ***= p<0.001, **= p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
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3.8 Career Pathways  
I have analyzed several cohorts of certified educators over time to describe 
educator career pathways along diverse roles for certified educators. Where possible 
given the need for data suppression in public reporting, I have differentiated for educators 
in Appalachian districts and outside Appalachian districts. All cohorts begin in the year 
2011 because years of experience data in the MUNIS data are not comprehensive for 
2009 and 2010. The first cohort includes teachers in their first year in 2011; the second 
cohort includes those who are classroom teachers with five years of experience in 2011; 
and the third cohort includes those with 10 years of experience in 2011. 
Table 3.8 illustrates the career paths over seven years for the 2700 teachers who 
started their first year as classroom teachers in Kentucky school districts. The analysis 
illustrates that by 2018, roughly 54 percent of this cohort remained in classroom teacher 
roles in Kentucky classrooms while little less than 4 percent had transitioned into other 
certified educator roles in Kentucky schools or school districts. Of this cohort, 21 had 
attained a position as a school-based instructional or curriculum consultant or coach – all 
of whom were in districts outside of Appalachia. Another 11 had attained a position as a 
school principal, with a majority of these principals serving in Appalachian districts.  
Table 3.8 Cohort 1: Kentucky First-Year Classroom Teachers in 2011 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Teacher 2700 2235 2015 1859 1764 1640 1533 1460 
Inst. Coach  - - - - 13 17 21 
School Admin.  - - - - - 16 20 
Specialist  - - - 12 19 22 36 
Principal  - - - - - - 11 
District Staff   - - - - - - 12 
Note: - = certified educator count <10 
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With Table 3.9, I explore the pathways over seven years for the 653 teachers who 
started their sixth year as a certified educator as a classroom teacher in Appalachian 
school districts, and the 1580 teachers who started their sixth year in districts outside of 
Appalachia. For this cohort, again, transitions to instructional coach positions are more 
likely for classroom teachers in districts outside of Appalachia. By 2018, their 13th year 
as a certified educator, 49 employees in districts outside of Appalachia held these 
positions, while fewer than 10 held these positions in Appalachian districts. Opportunities 
to become school principals, however, have increased for teachers in these cohorts in 
both Appalachian districts and in districts outside of Appalachia.  
Table 3.9 Cohort 2: Classroom Teachers with 5 Years Experience in 2011 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Appalachian Districts 
Teacher 653 619 591 573 558 541 526 512 
Inst. Coach  - - - - - - - 
School Admin.  - - - - 12 13 15 
Specialist  - - - - 15 18 20 
Principal  - - - - - - 13 
District Leaders  - - - - - - 10 
 
Districts Outside Appalachia 
Teacher 1580 1428 1367 1284 1227 1150 1081 1044 
Instr. Coach  10 16 21 29 34 44 49 
School Admin.  11 20 32 44 44 48 47 
Specialist  - 17 22 33 42 55 57 
Principal  - - - - 15 19 25 
District Leaders  - - - - 11 14 19 
Note: - = certified educator count <10 
 
For the third cohort, illustrated in Table 3.10, of those who enter their 11th year as a 
certified educator serving as a classroom teacher, teachers in districts outside Appalachia 
will again be more likely to serve in their 18th year as a certified educator as an 
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instructional coach or school administrator, as compared to their colleagues in districts in 
Appalachia. For this cohort, a higher proportion of female educators are serving as 
principals at their 18th year – 65 percent outside of Appalachia and 63 percent inside 
Appalachia.  
Table 3.10 Cohort 3: Classroom Teachers with 10 Years Experience in 2011 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Appalachian Districts 
Teacher 527 509 488 473 455 434 417 403 
Inst. Coach  - - - - - - - 
School Admin.  - - - - 14 11 - 
Specialist  - - - - 11 12 13 
Principal  - - - - - 11 16 
District Leaders  - - - - - - - 
 
Districts Outside Appalachia 
Teacher 1272 1161 1114 1044 1008 948 909 876 
Instr. Coach  11 14 22 27 28 29 33 
School Admin.  - 14 15 19 22 25 27 
Specialist  10 14 14 20 24 30 31 
Principal  - - - 10 11 18 20 
District Leaders  - - - - - - - 
3.9 Retirement 
How do retirement decisions differ in Appalachian districts and in districts 
outside Appalachia? As discussed earlier, teachers in Appalachia, on average, retire at an 
earlier age than teachers outside Appalachia. This pattern, however, emerged over the 
years 2009 to 2015 as teachers outside Appalachia retired at increasingly higher ages, on 
average (Table 3.11).  
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Table 3.11 Number of Retirements and Age, Classroom Teachers, by Year 
 Appalachian Districts 
Districts Outside 
Appalachia 
Year Number Mean Age Number Mean Age 
2009 338 57.6 871 58.0 
2010 395 57.5 985 58.7 
2011 347 57.9 640 58.9 
2012 423 57.6 651 59.5 
2013 338 57.8 733 59.8 
2014 337 57.6 733 59.4 
2015 332 58.0 841 60.1 
 
3.10 Discussion  
In this chapter, I have presented evidence across the pathway from initial 
placement to retirement that the Appalachian region has distinct labor market features. 
Graduates from high schools in Appalachia are more likely to attend Appalachian 
educator preparation programs and take their first positions in Appalachian school 
districts. Meanwhile, graduates from high schools in Kentucky school districts outside of 
Appalachia are far more likely to complete educator preparation in higher education 
institutions outside of Appalachia and take jobs in school districts beyond the 
Appalachian border. In terms of educator career pathways once they have taken positions, 
teachers in Appalachia have less opportunity to earn higher salaries and take on different 
responsibilities through roles such as instructional coaches and school-based 
administrators; although quick routes to principal positions are more available than in 
districts outside of Appalachia. Finally, retirement patterns show some evidence of 
divergence inside and outside of Appalachia; for example, with teachers outside of 
Appalachia retiring at increasingly higher ages.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4. EFFECTS OF REPORT CARD ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
Federal and state policymakers have adopted statewide, standards-based reforms 
such as academic standards, assessments, and accountability systems with the intention to 
spark improvements in academic achievement and educational attainment, and to ease 
disparities across student groups and across more- and less-advantaged schools and 
districts. By reporting information about school performance to the public and identifying 
struggling schools and districts for interventions, the systems seek to trigger “move” or 
“improve” responses. Parents or others in a community may use this information to 
decide where to live; this information may also influence decisions among several 
schooling options. This information may influence where teachers or other educators 
apply to work and the job offers they accept; it may also influence their decisions about 
whether to stay or leave a school or district. This information, finally, may influence 
administrators’ or policymakers’ decisions about school closings or student assignment 
patterns, moving students around to achieve certain goals. The accountability systems 
could also influence “improve” decisions. Transparent information may help mobilize 
community leaders, voters, or others to help schools improve; it may also help education 
leaders better understand areas of needed improvement. Schools can use productive 
strategies to increase performance, such as shifting use of instructional time, curriculum, 
or intervention strategies (Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2013). They may also 
respond through nefarious ways, such as teacher cheating (Jacob & Levitt, 2003) or 
gaming testing pools (Figlio, 2006). Accountability systems could influence none of 
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these actions, they could influence them in ways that do not contribute to legitimate 
improvement in academic achievement and educational attainment, or they could 
influence them in ways that further rather than ease disparities. 
The way accountability and public reporting systems are designed should matter 
to the kind of responses they elicit. Some systems are designed in hopes of catalyzing 
dramatic improvement among a small number of the lowest performing schools in a state, 
while others are designed with the intent of improving student performance among most 
or all schools. Some design decisions are made to concentrate energy in students at the 
lowest tail of the distribution, while other design decisions are made to incentivize 
improvement across lower to higher performing students. Finally, some policies are 
crafted to encourage schools to focus resources on students who fall in certain 
demographic or programmatic groups.  
In this chapter, I examine the causal effects of a part of a statewide accountability 
system designed to send a clear signal about need for improvement to schools and 
communities that were not accustomed to such a signal, and with incentives to improve 
student performance across the lowest to highest end of the distribution. Kentucky’s 
Unbridled Learning accountability system, as implemented in the 2011-12 school year, 
took an unusual approach as compared to other states’ systems at the time. Inspired by 
principles of the Baldridge performance management framework, Kentucky identified all 
schools and districts under the 70th percentile of a single statewide performance index 
with a classification of “Needs Improvement” and displayed that label on the school or 
district’s annual report card. Few statewide accountability systems have sent signals this 
clear to such a high proportion of schools and to schools with this high a level of 
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performance. In contrast, states with letter grade classifications (e.g. A-F) would be likely 
to label such schools with a “B” grade, which would likely not rouse the same level of 
alarm as a label of “Needs Improvement”. Most literature on the effects of accountability 
and public reporting focuses on labels attached to schools at the lowest end of the 
performance distribution, such as Priority schools under the ESEA waiver or ESSA 
policies or Reconstruction schools under NCLB. This study is also differentiated from 
other literature because the strict cut-off is around a single index score at the school level, 
in contrast to others that need to account for multiple cut-offs across a variety of 
measures.  
I build on conceptual frameworks from Gormley and Weimer (1999) to describe 
how such a system could change results at the school level. Given the strict cut-off, I use 
a straightforward regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of the 
“Needs Improvement” classification on school-level measures of student academic 
achievement and growth and on principal turnover. This essay builds on a recent RD 
study from Bonilla and Dee (2020) that examined the effects of Kentucky’s 
implementation of the federal Focus School classification. They found evidence of causal 
impact from the classification on student academic performance in reading and 
mathematics. I enhance their work by leveraging longitudinal, student-level assessment 
data for measures of student academic growth; I also examine impact not only on 
students but on school staff. Finally, my study seeks to give evidence toward a different, 
if related question – the effect of an accountability signal that is simply reported to the 
public with no “carrots” or “sticks” attached.  
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4.2 Motivation 
Most statewide accountability systems have included policy instruments such as 
school report cards that could inspire “move” and “improve” responses among educators, 
parents, and the public. In contrast, place-based approaches to increasing academic 
achievement and educational attainment often focus on collective impact or other 
continuous improvement data use strategies that are focused on spurring “improve” 
actions. The federal Promise Neighborhood program, for example, has embraced 
collective action approaches for grantees such as Berea College’s Partners for Education, 
which serves several economically distressed counties in Appalachia. Other place-based 
initiatives such as the Network for College Success in Chicago use networked 
improvement community (NIC) approaches developed by Tony Bryk of the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (see Bryk (2015) for a description of the 
NIC approach). Mission: Graduate in Albuquerque, NM, a part of the Strive Together 
Network, issues an annual, community report card to the public to track progress toward 
their goals. While federal law has increasingly emphasized the importance of statewide 
school report cards as policy instruments, philanthropy focused on improving economic 
mobility has increasingly signaled interest in place-based continuous improvement 
strategies (e.g. the Gates Foundation’s Networks for School Improvement, and the Strive 
Together Network funded by the Ballmer Group and other foundations).  
The 2015 reauthorization of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA), the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) elevated school report cards as an 
important policy instrument and elevated expectations for the breadth and depth of 
information to be delivered to the public. While it weakened the federal role in district 
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and school accountability classifications and interventions, it signaled a stronger federal 
role in school report cards. In comparison to the accountability provisions of its 
precursor, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), ESSA gives states far more 
latitude to determine how to differentiate performance and design classifications (e.g. 
labels such as “B” or “needs improvement”) to summarize these differences across 
districts and schools. It also gives states more flexibility to prescribe interventions for 
districts and schools with low classifications. The law, however, increases requirements 
for the report cards that states publish at the state, district, and school levels.  
ESSA requires states to report new indicators, such as postsecondary enrollment 
and school-level per-pupil expenditures. Several scholars have noted that state policy 
decisions following the U.S. Department of Education’s ESEA waiver program in 2010 
led to wider variation in accountability and reporting (J. Chubb & Clark, 2013; Dunlap, 
2011; Polikoff, McEachin, Wrabel, & Duque, 2014). Information collected in January 
2019 by the Data Quality Campaign (DQC), a national advocacy group, suggests states 
will also have a variety of responses to the newer ESSA requirements in law and in 
regulation. DQC found that of all states, 50 reported measures of student achievement 
and 39 reported measures of student growth. About half of states included information 
about the district and school summative accountability rating (26) and student discipline 
data (25). Less than half reported information on postsecondary enrollment (24), teachers 
on emergency or provisional credentials (20), inexperienced teachers and principals (19), 
teachers teaching out of field (17), teacher demographic data (11), teacher effectiveness 
(5), and per-pupil expenditures (5).  
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In addition to what states report on school report cards, ESSA also defines higher 
expectations for the processes that states use to engage parents and other stakeholders in 
their development and distribution. Through their analysis, DQC found that 15 states 
offer translations of school and district report cards into languages other than English. 
The text complexity of these English-language report cards was in many cases formidable 
– middle to high school level in 15 states, college-level for 16 states, and above college-
level for 17 states.  
In light of enhanced attention to school report cards in statewide education policy, 
and potential diffusion of community-wide report cards linked to place-based approaches, 
with this chapter I extend Gormley and Weimer (1999) conceptual frameworks on 
organizational report cards. I leverage principal-agent theory to identify key actors and 
how they may influence “move” or “improve” actions. It also seeks to contribute 
empirical evidence about the causal effects of a school report card that signals need for 
improvement among a majority of schools, including effects on student academic growth 
and principal turnover. 
Research questions: 
• How does a school report card with a “needs improvement” classification 
affect student academic growth in reading and mathematics in schools 
with the classification? Are these effects different for students at varying 
levels of prior achievement? 
• How does a school report card with a “needs improvement” classification 
affect principal turnover in schools with that classification? 
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4.3 Kentucky Policy Context  
Kentucky, along with North Carolina and Texas, was an early adopter of 
statewide accountability and public reporting systems for schools.  In 1992, the Kentucky 
Department of Education (KDE) first published school-level results from its Kentucky 
Instructional Results Information System, or KIRIS (Koretz & Barron, 1998). KIRIS was 
based on an index of student outcome data, with each school assigned a single index 
score as a baseline. Schools had improvement targets to meet; schools that did not meet 
targets faced consequences, such as intervention from improvement experts, or rewards 
such as school-wide bonuses for teachers. Assessment and accountability regimes 
changed over time, and funding for school rewards dwindled to zero, but student 
assessment, accountability decisions, and public reporting remained core components of 
state policy. In 2009, the Kentucky General Assembly approved Senate Bill 1, an 
omnibus education reform that mandated new, internationally-benchmarked academic 
content standards aligned to college- and career-ready expectations, assessments aligned 
to those standards, and a new accountability and report card system that would 
incorporate a broader array of measures, including college- and career-ready measures for 
students in high schools. Meanwhile, Congress had missed its deadline to reauthorize 
NCLB by 2007. In September 2011, the Obama Administration announced a new policy 
to grant states waivers from NCLB’s accountability requirements. In February 2012, the 
U.S. Department of Education approved Kentucky’s new “Unbridled Learning” 
accountability system (Kentucky Department of Education, 2012).  
Kentucky’s new accountability system took effect in the 2011-12 school year. In 
keeping with the state’s longstanding policy, the system incorporated a single index score 
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that combined results across measures. It added measures that had not been used in 
Kentucky before, such as a longitudinal student growth measure for reading and 
mathematics, which made up the largest component of elementary and middle school 
index scores. As required in the federal ESEA waiver policy, it identified as Priority 
Schools those schools with the lowest 5 percent of performance and as Focus Schools the 
10 percent of schools with the lowest-performing subgroups. It also met waiver 
requirements by identifying the highest performing schools as Reward Schools.  
Kentucky, however, went beyond federal waiver requirements in its classification 
of schools. In 2012, it identified all schools below the 70th percentile of performance on 
the index score as Needs Improvement schools. This policy was approved and 
communicated to schools prior to spring test administration; although no rewards or 
sanctions accompanied it, the Needs Improvement label was reported prominently on the 
first page of school profiles on the Kentucky School Report Card website (see Figure 
4.1). Schools above the Needs Improvement cut off were classified as Proficient and 
those above an even higher cut-off were deemed Distinguished (see Figure 4.2). KDE 
maintained the classification scheme through the 2015-16 school year; however, 
beginning in the 2012-13 school year, it replaced the percentile cut-off approach with 
absolute cut scores differentiated by elementary, middle, and high school. The Unbridled 
Learning accountability system ended in 2015-16, with no accountability system in 2016-
17 and 2017-18. 
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Figure 4.1 Report Card Classification – Needs Improvement 
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Figure 4.2 Number of Schools by Accountability Classification 
4.4 Literature Review 
4.4.1 Accountability effects on school and community outcomes 
Since the advent of school and district accountability systems, researchers have 
advanced understanding about how these systems have affected student outcomes as well 
as the mechanisms driving changes in those outcomes (Figlio & Loeb, 2011). This 
literature suggests that consequences matter – accountability systems that employ 
credible risks of sanctions elicit responses, while those that rely only on reporting 
information have no effect or have less effect than accountability policies that involve 
consequences (Dee & Jacob, 2011; Deming, Cohodes, Jennings, & Jencks, 2016; 
Hanushek & Raymond, 2005). Most recently, Bonilla and Dee (2020) used a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design to examine the causal effect of Kentucky’s “consequential” 
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accountability policy of assigning Focus School status to schools with low-performing 
groups of students. Using school-level proficiency data, they find positive, significant 
effects from Focus School status in both reading and math performance among 
traditionally underperforming groups of students in schools. However, they used school-
level data on proficient and advanced performance on statewide assessments; examining 
change over time on these aggregate results may have led to misinterpretations due to 
shifts in enrollment or student population from year to year, which are particularly acute 
in high-poverty schools that may be more likely to be labelled as Focus Schools. My 
study leverages student-level data to create measures of academic growth that follow 
individual students year over year, avoiding these concerns.  
Over these years, scholars have examined effects of reporting district and school 
information on a wide variety of other outcomes, finding effects on perceptions of public 
officials (Clinton & Grissom, 2015), perceptions of district and school quality (Barrows, 
Henderson, Peterson, & West, 2016; Chingos, Henderson, & West, 2010), voter behavior 
in bond referenda (Kogan et al., 2016b), education spending (Craig, Imberman, & 
Perdue, 2013; Schueler & West, 2015), and on community effects such as property values 
or residential segregation (Black, 1999; Downes & Zabel, 2002; Figlio & Lucas, 2004; 
Hasan & Kumar, 2018). They have also examined impacts of providing district-level 
information on policy preferences (Clinton & Grissom, 2015) and turnover of local 
school board members and superintendents (Kogan et al., 2016a), finding no effects.  
The literature has addressed questions about parents’ preferences for school 
enrollment in choice-based systems, as revealed through information provided about 
districts and schools, often on report cards (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Schellenberg, & 
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Walters, 2017; Corcoran, Jennings, Cohodes, & Sattin-Bajaj, 2018; Harris & Larsen, 
2015; Hastings & Weinstein, 2008; Schneider & Buckley, 2002). Using experiments, 
scholars have examined how providing different types of information, such as student 
achievement versus student growth (Houston & Henig, 2019) and displaying information 
in different formats (Glazerman & Dotter, 2017; Glazerman, Nichols-Barrer, Valant, 
Chandler, & Burnett, 2018; Jacobsen, Snyder, & Saultz, 2014) can affect report card 
users’ perceptions of and preferences for schools and districts.  
The literature specific to information about school and district performance 
complements scholarship on providing information about the performance of institutions 
across the education continuum, from early childhood (Bassok, Dee, & Latham, 2017) to 
higher education (Dill & Soo, 2005; Fowles, Frederickson, & Koppell, 2016; Salmi & 
Saroyan, 2007). Similar research about providing information about quality-of-care in 
hospitals (Faber, Bosch, Wollersheim, Leatherman, & Grol, 2009; Hibbard, Greene, 
Sofaer, Firminger, & Hirsh, 2012; Wang, Hockenberry, Chou, & Yang, 2011) has shown 
modest effects.  
4.4.2 Accountability effects on educator mobility and attrition 
The literature has found mixed evidence about how school accountability systems 
affect the education labor market. Most evidence examines teacher and principal turnover 
(measured at the school level), or mobility across schools or districts (in which moves of 
individual teachers or principals can be observed in data). Some literature examines how 
accountability affects teacher assignments to tested or non-tested grades. As a whole, this 
literature has several limitations. Research has primarily focused on observed patterns of 
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turnover or mobility; while these are likely to be supply effects, they may also reflect 
changes in demand. Studies have focused within a single state (Florida or North Carolina) 
or city (New York City) context, with little evidence about turnover or mobility across 
multiple states and cities. Most quasi-experimental studies at the state and city level have 
focused on narrow and short-term impacts, rather than asking larger questions that 
encompass effects on entry and exit into the profession. For example, descriptive analysis 
from Cowen et al. (2012) finds that Kentucky teachers were more likely to exit the 
profession following implementation of the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, 
which included consequential accountability.  
One quasi-experimental analysis has asked these larger questions, and separated 
out supply and demand effects. Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2017) analyze the impact of NCLB 
on teacher mobility and attrition – teacher-initiated reflecting supply and school-initiated 
reflecting demand effects. They pool cross-sectional data from four waves of national 
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and Follow-Up surveys between 1993-95 and 2007-
09, and apply a differences-in-differences model at the state level that compares states 
that did not have consequential accountability prior to NCLB to those that did, following 
Dee and Jacob (2011). Their findings suggest that NCLB did not contribute to mobility 
from teacher-initiated transfers and did not contribute to teacher attrition from the 
profession. Their findings do suggest that NCLB increased the rate of teacher mobility 
due to school-initiated separations. It also reduced mobility and attrition for teachers who 
report spending more time on work during the week, who agree with school leadership, 
and who agree with accountability for student outcomes. The authors conducted an array 
of tests with alternative specifications and arrived at similar results.  
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Using both difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods, Feng 
et al. (2018) exploit a grading and calibration change in Florida’s accountability system 
to identify the effects of school ratings (grades A-F) on teacher turnover. They find that 
schools with an “F” shock experienced higher teacher mobility relative to schools that 
just missed the “F” cut-off score. Teachers with higher value-added estimates were more 
likely to leave; as a result, the schools suffered a net reduction in average teacher quality. 
It is not known, however, if this mobility was motivated due to supply concerns (e.g. 
teachers voluntarily leaving for higher-performing schools) or demand concerns (district 
or school leaders seeking to reconstitute the school faculty). Using a similar regression 
discontinuity method, Dizon-Ross (2018) extends their analysis by examining the value-
added of new teachers as well as those who leave. She finds significant impacts from 
introduction of the 2007 school accountability system in New York City, finding that at 
the C/D and D/F accountability rating thresholds, receiving the lower grade reduces 
teacher turnover and increases the likelihood that experienced teachers joining the school 
will have higher value-added estimates. The study found no difference in the value-added 
of school leavers among schools above and below the grading thresholds. It is not 
apparent why accountability pressure promotes mobility among higher value-added 
teachers in Florida, while decreasing mobility and attracting higher value-added teachers 
in New York City. Programmatic differences in terms of consequences in the two settings 
may play a role; institutional constraints may as well. 
Several studies have examined how educator mobility changes after introduction 
of a new or revised accountability system. Shirrell (2016) employs a regression 
discontinuity model before and after introduction of NCLB in North Carolina, with a 
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focus on the minimum “n-size” of 40 students needed for a school to be held accountable 
for a subgroup of students. He focuses on the black and white students subgroup cut-offs 
for AYP. He finds no overall effects on teacher turnover around the subgroup-level 
thresholds. This analysis does find lower attrition for black teachers in schools with 
enough black students to be held accountable for the black student subgroup, and finds a 
lower likelihood of schools accountable for the black student subgroup to assign black 
teachers to black students.  Using differences in differences estimation, Li (2015) finds 
that in North Carolina, introduction of school accountability through NCLB led to lower 
principal quality (as measured by higher value-added estimates in mathematics) in 
schools with disadvantaged student populations. The study is limited in that it considers 
only a small sample of principals who moved during the period pre- and post- policy 
implementation – it finds only that conditional on moving, higher value-added principals 
from schools with demographics placed them more likely to face sanctions are more 
likely to move to schools that would be less likely to face sanctions. Using an individual 
teacher discrete-time duration model for North Carolina elementary school teachers from 
1995-2001, Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, and Diaz (2004) find higher teacher mobility in 
low-performing schools following introduction of the state’s ABC accountability system. 
While they find that new hires were no more likely to be experienced than they were 
prior to accountability, they are not able to observe effectiveness levels of teachers.  
In years leading up to introduction of consequential accountability in New York 
City, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2008) analyze teacher turnover and 
characteristics before and after introduction of student testing in the fourth grade. Using a 
logit model, they find that fourth grade teachers subject to the new testing requirement 
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are less likely to leave as compared to teachers in other grades. Of new teachers in the 
fourth grade, they were less likely to be inexperienced. Of new teachers in the fourth 
grade in low-performing schools, they were more likely to be from competitive 
undergraduate institutions. Although their model includes a rich set of covariates, it is not 
sufficient to make causal claims about the effect of the new testing requirement in the 
fourth grade.  
Several studies have found evidence that lower-performing teachers (as defined 
by value-added) or teachers whose students score lower on assessments are re-assigned to 
kindergarten to second grade classes, prior to onset of testing for accountability. For 
example, Grissom, Kalogrides, and Loeb (2017) find that Miami teachers whose students 
score lower on assessments in one year are more likely to be reassigned to a non-tested 
grade in the following year. Their findings also suggest that such “strategic staffing” 
moves lower student learning gains in first to second grade, as measured by a 
standardized assessment.  
4.4.3 Accountability effects on determinants of educator mobility and attrition 
The literature has found some evidence about the impact of school and district 
accountability systems on several determinants of educator mobility and attrition, such as 
perceptions of job security, sense of autonomy or control, support from administrators 
and teacher peers, and ultimately, job satisfaction and job commitment.  
Two studies evaluate how NCLB changed these determinants among teachers, 
using the national Schools and Staffing Survey. Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and 
Harrington (2014) use multiple waves of the SASS. Across pre-NCLB to NCLB eras, 
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they find trends that teachers work longer hours, feel more sense of control in their jobs, 
and feel more support from administrators, peers, and parents. To isolate which if any of 
these trends reflected a causal impact from NCLB, they use a similar empirical strategy 
as Dee and Jacob (2011), exploiting variation across states in pre-NCLB accountability 
systems. They use difference-in-differences (DID) as well as comparative interrupted 
time series (CITS) estimates, finding no statistically significant impact of NCLB on 
teacher work hours. With a DID estimate, they find a small statistically significant 
increase in feelings of control due to NCLB, and DID and CITS estimates suggest a 
positive impact of NCLB on administrator support, but no impact on parental support. In 
terms of job satisfaction and job commitment, although both rose from the pre-NCLB to 
NCLB eras, the analyses failed to detect any statistically significant impact from NCLB 
itself.   
Reback et al. (2014) has a more extensive analysis of these and other questions. 
They use the 2003-04 SASS as well as the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS), 
matching students and teachers to schools, and exploiting cross-state variation in the 
likelihood of failing Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) requirements. They find that 
NCLB pressure reduced teachers’ perceptions of job security, particularly among 
inexperienced teachers. It also led to changes to work hours, increasing hours among 
specialists such as reading specialists, and decreasing hours among generalists such as 
classroom teachers. The research also found that NCLB reduced instructional time 
devoted to science and social studies. This paper adds a great deal to the literature, as it 
goes beyond the blunt measurement of consequential accountability at the state level used 
in Dee and Jacob (2011) to evaluate the impact of different levels of likelihood of failing 
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AYP as a continuous probability measure both at the state and school levels. The authors 
also take the step of comparing the probabilities they calculated for the paper with survey 
results from the RAND Education ISBA survey of teachers and principals, which asked 
principals to predict whether they would make AYP that year. By connecting the SASS 
data to ECLS data, it is also able to draw conclusions about the impact of accountability 
pressure on student learning gains – finding that accountability pressure from NCLB had 
a positive influence on student achievement on low-stakes reading tests and no influence 
on math and science tests. Finally, their analysis on teacher impacts is strengthened 
because they replicated the analysis on the 2000-01 SASS sample as a falsification study, 
and found no significant impacts.  
Teacher absence may be a readily-observed indicator of low job support, 
satisfaction, and commitment. Rockoff and Turner (2010) use the 2007 accountability 
shock for New York City schools to analyze its effect on teacher absences, finding no 
impact – although their analysis is limited to a very short time horizon. Gershenson 
(2016), however, employs a differences-in-differences model in the North Carolina 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) context, finding that failing AYP in one year led to 
lower average teacher absences as well as lower frequency of absences in the following 
year. These shifts were concentrated in the lower distribution of teacher effectiveness, 
and largely driven by teachers in Title I schools subject to the highest level of sanctions. 
The analysis, however, was restricted to only two years under NCLB – 2003 and 2004; it 
is not known if this result would hold over multiple years of NCLB implementation.  
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4.5 Conceptual Framework 
Two decades ago, Gormley and Weimer (1999) contributed conceptual 
frameworks focused on public reporting about the performance of organizations, such as 
schools and hospitals, that serve clients (e.g. students and patients) and carry out 
functions that serve public policy aims (e.g. higher educational attainment, more cost-
effective health services). Their work drew from several public policy traditions to 
conceive of “organizational report cards” as policy instruments intended to increase 
accountability and decrease information asymmetries. It considered how incentives could 
interact with organizational rules and culture to shape responses at the institutional level. 
It also brought in theory from information utilization to discuss how report cards could 
reach – and influence – the public. Their frameworks predict not only how organizational 
report cards could have positive effects from the perspective of policymakers and/or 
clients, but how they could create problematic responses – such as cream-skimming or 
even perpetuating information inequities – from institutions and the public. Since that 
time, the use of organizational report cards as policy instruments and the capacity to 
deliver valid performance information to the public has only heightened.  
They define an organizational report card as: 
...a regular effort by an organization to collect data on two or more 
other organizations, transform the data into information relevant to 
assessing performance, and transmit the information to some audience 
external to the organization themselves. Many, though not all, 
organizational report cards transform data into ratings or rankings of 
multiple organizations.  
This definition highlights two important concepts that distinguish district and school 
report cards from other examples of public reporting. The first is the requirement that 
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report cards communicate multiple measures of performance. This excludes public 
reporting that includes results on only one measure, such as publishing school-level 
scores from a single academic assessment. The second critical concept is that of 
comparability – that the measures are reported in a way to allow for valid comparisons 
across schools and school districts. Stating that the “data must be put in a form that 
facilitates interpretation by some external audience,” Gormley and Weimer (1999) 
differentiate organizational report cards from other, more internal-facing sources of 
information about performance such as “performance measures, benchmarking, balanced 
scorecards, reporting requirements, and program evaluation. 
Under their framework, report cards are instruments of both top-down and 
bottom-up accountability. For top-down accountability, they can inform “citizens, 
politicians, and public managers” to “increase their interest in and capacity for 
oversight”. These top-down purposes would be most likely for issues with high levels of 
government (or philanthropic) funding, when the issue is of high salience to 
policymakers (or philanthropists), and when there is concern about performance. For 
bottom-up accountability, they can affect consumers’ choices, “prices they are willing to 
pay, and the complaints they are willing to voice.” They note that the more choices 
available and the more informative the report card, the higher likelihood that it will spur 
bottom-up accountability.  
A 1992 report on school report cards from the Southern Regional Education 
Board summarized policymakers’ “presumed intentions” for requiring school report cards 
(Gaines & Cornett, 1992; Harrington, 1993): 
93 
 
…parents and state leaders need to be kept up-to-date about what 
students know and can do. When schools report regularly and clearly 
on results, government, business, and community leaders are more 
willing to ease regulations and leave decisions in the hands of teachers 
and principals. Taxpayers also want a straightforward report card 
showing whether their major investment in public education is paying 
off.   
Principal-agent theory (J. E. Chubb & Moe, 2011; Moe, 1984, 1990, 2006; 
Waterman & Meier, 1998) assumes differentiation of goals between principal and agent, 
with greater information on the part of agents. Principal agent theory fits both with 
notions of top-down accountability and bottom-up accountability. In the first instance, 
principals may be voters, elected officials, employers, or appointed education leaders. In 
the case of bottom-up accountability, principals may be current parents, students, youth 
service organization leaders, faith or other community leaders. For K-12 education, 
agents may be educators with more information than a state legislator who is worried 
about rising rates of remedial education in community colleges, or a local parent group 
concerned about declining opportunities for music education in elementary schools. In 
environments such as school report cards that serve both top-down and bottom-up 
accountability functions, agents likely serve multiple principals, all with different goals. 
Principals engaged in top-down accountability functions, especially if oversight is 
constrained by law or lack of funding, may see school report cards as a way to encourage 
more robust bottom-up accountability actions – “move” and/or “improve” actions. In 
these instances, school report cards would be more successful from the view of the top-
down principal if there is goal alignment with principals engaged in bottom-up 
accountability functions. Evidence suggests that a lack of goal alignment between elected 
officials and parents may be the norm (Jaeger, 1994). 
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In the case of school report cards that seek to involve top-down and bottom-up 
accountability mechanisms, who exactly is the agent – district leaders such as a school 
superintendent, school principals, or classroom teachers? Gormley and Weimer (1999) 
offer a compelling direction, noting, “Organizational managers, who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the quality of services delivered to clients, are the focal points for both 
bottom-up and top-down accountability.” If so, school principals would be the primary 
“focal point” for school report cards, the primary agents with high levels of information 
and distinct goals from those who exercise top-down or bottom-up accountability 
functions. Early work on school reporting found that among groups of parents, district 
administrators, community leaders, and others, school principals had strongly divergent 
(and negative) views about school report cards. 
Ultimately, within a principal-agent framework, the primary purposes of school 
report cards are to align goals across principals and agents and to ease information 
asymmetries. If this is successful, top-down oversight functions and/or bottom-up choices 
or mobilization could lead to improved academic outcomes for students. I hypothesize 
that top-down accountability from Kentucky’s school report card would be focused on 
improving performance among the lowest-performing students (evidence includes the 
Kentucky Department of Education’s statewide “novice reduction” program) and bottom-
up accountability would be focused on improving performance among the highest 
performers (e.g. advocacy from parent groups with high political and social capital), so 
causal effects from the “Needs Improvement” classification would be most likely to be 
seen among these groups on reading and mathematics. I will examine these shifts two 
ways: through changes in academic achievement levels at the school level (percent 
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novice or percent distinguished) – which can detect changes from “move” accountability 
functions; while changes in student growth can better detect changes based on “improve” 
functions.  
I also hypothesize that schools with the “needs improvement” label would be 
more likely to experience turnover of principals – those with the greatest responsibility 
for school quality – although it would not be seen until two years after classification due 
to Kentucky’s school-based approach to hiring school principals. 
4.6 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study uses school-level data on all Kentucky elementary schools from 2011-
12 to 2016-17 along with student-level assessment data for all Kentucky students in 
grades 3-5. The school-level data, available for public download from the Kentucky 
School Report Card website, include accountability profile information such as the 
school’s accountability index score and classification, along with state assessment results 
for reading and mathematics and other subjects. The data also include a rich set of 
covariates including school enrollment information. To construct measures of student 
academic growth, I use longitudinal student assessment data in reading and mathematics 
supplied under a Memorandum of Understanding with the Kentucky Center for Statistics 
and the Kentucky Department of Education. I convert scale scores to standardized z-
scores, and then construct annual gain scores (e.g. 4th grade mathematics z-score in year t 
– 3rd grade mathematics z-score in year t-1). I then create school-level growth scores for 
all students, and for two subsets of students – those who were in the lowest quintile of 
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performance in the previous year and those who were in the highest quintile of 
performance in the previous year.  
The data show that the likelihood of a school being identified as Needs 
Improvement declined over time. Between 2012 and 2016, the percentage of elementary 
schools identified as Needs Improvement declined from 69 percent (which is consistent 
with the policy of identifying schools below the 70th percentile) to 39 percent, while the 
average accountability score increased. Over this time period, principal turnover events 
were highest in 2013 and 2014.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Observations 733 730 720 712 709 711 
Needs 
Improvement 
69% 66% 52% 46% 39% n/a 
Accountability 
Score 
57.5 
(9.44) 
58.5 
(8.86) 
68.6 
(8.09) 
68.1 
(7.35) 
69.5 
(9.55) 
n/a 
Index 
-4.99 
(9.44) 
-3.94 
(8.86) 
-0.802 
(8.09) 
0.888 
(7.35) 
2.32 
(9.55) 
n/a 
Principal 
turnover 
events 
n/a 145 179 107 108 122 
Free or 
Reduced 
Lunch 
students 
.654 
(.208) 
.651 
(.186) 
.655 
(.185) 
.664 
(.181) 
.670 
(.181) 
.674 
(.177) 
4.7 Empirical Strategy 
The 2011 federal ESEA waiver policy required states to assign school classifications 
to the lowest 15 percent and highest 5 percent of schools, leaving school classifications 
for the remaining 80 percent of schools to state discretion. Some states declined to 
classify these schools at all, while other states used standards-based methods to assign 
97 
 
classifications (for example, denoting that Level 5 schools would have index scores 
above 80). Kentucky’s policy to use a percentile-based cut point to assign the Needs 
Improvement/Proficient classification was unusual, as was its intention to set the bar at 
such a high level as to identify the vast majority of schools with the Needs Improvement 
classification. This study exploits the strict cut-off, employing a sharp RD design to 
estimate the average treatment effect on student reading and mathematics achievement of 
a school being assigned the Needs Improvement classification. The RD approach appears 
especially promising given limited options (theoretically) for schools to manipulate their 
classification, which in 2012 depended not only on their own performance but how their 
performance compared to other schools.  
In an ideal experiment, we would randomly assign schools with the same index 
score to a control group or to a treatment group with a Needs Improvement classification 
displayed prominently on their school report card. In the absence of such an experiment, 
the local nature of the RD design allows us to examine differences across the index score 
thresholds, creating treatment and control groups that (if assumptions are met) are as 
good as randomly assigned. 
I estimate the following model: 
Y it = α +  δNeedsImp it + β1 Index it + β2 Index
2
 it + β3 NeedsImp it x Index it + β4 
NeedsImp it x Index
2
 it + X it + µ it 
where NeedsImp is an indicator of whether a school is eligible for the Needs 
Improvement classification (the running variable Index ≤ 0, with the index score each 
year centered on 0 at the cut-off). If the assumptions underlying RD are met, δ will 
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provide an estimate of the causal effect of eligibility to be assigned the Needs 
Improvement label on Y it.  
4.7.1 Model A: Student achievement 
In this model, Y it reflects school-level student achievement results reported on the 
Kentucky School Report Card. These data have direct policy implications as they factor 
into the school’s accountability index score. I run the model separately for the following 
dependent variables: the percent of students novice in reading, the percent of students 
novice in mathematics, the percent of students distinguished in reading, and the percent 
of students distinguished in mathematics. In the accountability index, schools received 0 
points for students who score novice and 1.25 points for students who score 
distinguished. In these models, X it includes a covariate – the percent of students eligible 
for free or reduced lunch – along with lagged reading and math scores to control for all 
factors that affected prior test performance (approximating a growth model) and to 
capture any possible changes due to shifts in school enrollment patterns.  
4.7.2 Model B: Student growth 
Even with inclusion of lagged dependent variables and covariates intended to 
capture year-to-year enrollment shifts, Model A relies only on school-level data and as 
such may estimate increases or decreases in student achievement related to unobserved 
policy shifts or changes in context (e.g. school boundary shifts, new programs, or 
changes in housing patterns) rather than increased or decreased student learning. To 
provide alternative evidence, I estimate Model B using four school-level measures of 
student growth that I calculated from longitudinal student-level assessment data. I use 
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school-level rather than student-level data in Model B because the treatment is at the 
school level and my specific interest is in how the treatment, on average, affects student 
learning at the lower and higher ends of the performance distribution.  The four 
dependent variables in Model B are the following: average gain scores in reading among 
students at the lowest quintile of prior achievement, average gain scores in mathematics 
among students at the lowest quintile of prior achievement, average gain scores in 
reading among students at the highest quintile of prior achievement, and average gain 
scores in mathematics among students at the highest quintile of prior achievement.  
4.7.3 Model C: Principal Turnover 
I estimate a similar RD model for principal turnover (1 if a turnover is observed 
and 0 if it is not) using logistic regression and adding an additional lag for the treatment 
and index variables given the length of time needed for new principal hiring processes in 
Kentucky, which are led by local school councils made up of parents and teachers: 
Y it = α +  δNeedsImp it + β1 Index it  + θNeedsImp i,t-1 + β2 Index i,t-1 + X it + µ it 
 
4.7.4 RD tests 
Although this is technically an Intent to Treat (ITT) approach, given that 
eligibility (index below the cut-off) predicted treatment more than 99% of the time for 
elementary schools for each year (Table 4.2), it is nearly a treatment effect. I compute the 
optimal bandwidth is approximately +/- 7 (Cattaneo, Jansson, & Ma, 2018; Imbens & 
Kalyanaraman, 2012), similar to the bandwidth used in Bonilla and Dee (2020).  
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Table 4.2 Probability of Treatment 
Year Index≤0 Index>0 
2012 .994 0 
2013 .993 0 
2014 1 0 
2015 .996 0 
2016 .993 0 
 
Two major assumptions must be met for a valid regression discontinuity design: 
continuity of the running variable and lack of manipulation of the running variable. 
Visual tests using histograms for each year of the accountability index score (Figure 4.3) 
suggest that the running variable is continuous but not smooth, with some clear clusters 
of schools with similar scores on both sides of the cut-off. Although the McCrary (2008) 
test and the RD Manipulation Test from Cattaneo et al. (2018) – Table 4.3 – reject the 
hypothesis of manipulation of the running variable (Figure 4.4), the 2013 and 2015 
histograms appear to have a cluster of schools right below the cut-off, which could 
suggest some manipulation of the overall index score. It is possible that at the state level, 
decisions that affected accountability scores (e.g. inclusion of student test scores) could 
have been made in a way to increase the number of schools right below the cut-off, but it 
is not clear that any actors in the process would have the incentive to do so.  
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of Accountability Scores, 2013 - 2016 
 
 
Figure 4.4 McCrary Test for Manipulation of Running Variable 
 
 
Table 4.3 RD Manipulation Test 
Method  T P>|T| 
Conventional -0.225 0.822 
Robust -1.42 0.153 
 
Regression discontinuity also assumes that within the chosen bandwidth, there 
will be no difference in other relevant variables. In this case, however, I do find that 
schools below and above the cut-off differ along several dimensions (Table 4.4). Schools 
below the cutoff within the bandwidth have a higher average percentage of students 
eligible for free or reduced lunch, lower average years of teaching experience, and lower 
student attendance rates.  
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Table 4.4 Balance Test for Bandwidth +/- 7 
 Index -7 to 0 Index 0 to 7 Difference 
Percent free or reduced lunch 
students 
68.2 60.8 7.4*** 
(0.01) 
Average years teaching 
experience 
11.9 12.2 -0.288* 
(0.112) 
Attendance rate 95.2 95.5 -0.321*** 
(0.052) 
N 1,048 963  
       ***= p<0.001, **= p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
 
4.8 Results  
The models provide some causal evidence that “report card” accountability in 
Kentucky had small impacts on student achievement and growth that were statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Table 4.5 reports results from the primary regression 
models for elementary student achievement. Results suggest causal effects that increase 
the percentage of students distinguished in mathematics. These results were robust to 
alternative specifications with variations of the Index and NeedsImpxIndex variables, 
along with different versions of covariates.  
Table 4.5 Regression Results, Model A School-Level Student Achievement 
 % students 
“distinguished” 
in mathematics 
% students 
“distinguished” 
in reading 
% students 
“novice” in 
mathematics 
% students 
“novice” in 
reading 
NeedsImp 1.82*** 
(0.057) 
0.797 
(0.469) 
-0.019 
(0.584) 
-0.393 
(0.543) 
Index 0.668* 
(0.264) 
0.204 
(0.232) 
0.061 
(0.269) 
-0.111 
(0.271) 
Index2 -0.062 
(0.037) 
-0.019 
(0.033) 
-0.009 
(0.057) 
0.001 
(0.037) 
NeedsImp x 
Index 
-0.389 
(0.367) 
0.129 
(0.339) 
0.417 
(0.403) 
0.539 
(0.396) 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
NeedsImp x 
Index2 
0.083 
(0.054) 
0.047 
(0.045) 
0.088 
(0.057) 
0.068 
(0.057) 
Prior score 
mathematics  
0.621*** 
(0.028) 
0.140*** 
(0.024) 
0.623*** 
(0.032) 
0.194*** 
(0.029) 
Prior score 
reading  
0.176*** 
(0.028) 
0.612*** 
(0.026) 
0.230*** 
(0.028) 
0.681*** 
(0.027) 
%students Free 
or Reduced 
Lunch 
-3.84*** 
(0.841) 
-4.96*** 
(0.799) 
1.09*** 
(0.811) 
4.12*** 
(0.747) 
2014 
1.37*** 
(0.313) 
5.76*** 
(0.297) 
-2.55*** 
(0.342) 
-3.28*** 
(0.351) 
2015 
-0.445 
(0.299) 
-0.791*** 
(0.242) 
1.15*** 
(0.348) 
-1.39*** 
(0.318) 
2016 
0.421 
(0.322) 
5.12*** 
(0.297) 
-1.44 
(0.372) 
0.034 
(0.356) 
2017 
-4.07 
(0.321) 
-1.37*** 
(0.294) 
-0.342 
(0.366) 
0.897 
(0.364) 
Constant 4.57 
(0.911) 
6.32 
(0.911) 
0.922 
(0.696) 
1.05 
(0.693) 
Notes: School level data from the Kentucky School Report Card website; robust standard 
errors clustered by school; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05; bandwidth <7 & >-7; 1,984 
observations in 662 school clusters; Omitted year dummy: 2013.  
 
Table 4.6 reports similar results using student growth measures. Results suggest 
two causal effects – increasing mathematics performance for students in the highest 
previous quintiles of achievement and reading performance for students in the lowest 
quintile of previous achievement.  
Table 4.6 Regression Results, Model B: Student Growth 
 Math z-score 
gains for 
students in 
highest quintile 
Reading z-
score gains for 
students in 
highest quintile 
Math z-score 
gains for 
students in 
lowest quintile 
Reading z-
score gains for 
students in 
lowest quintile 
NeedsImp 0.067* 
(0.030) 
0.045 
(0.028) 
0.016 
(0.032) 
0.064* 
(0.031) 
Index 0.011 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
0.427** 
(0.015) 
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
Index2 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
NeedsImp x 
Index 
0.005 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.044* 
(0.021) 
NeedsImp x 
Index2 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
2014 
-0.064*** 
(0.015) 
0.053*** 
(0.015) 
-0.039* 
(0.017) 
0.056** 
(0.019) 
2015 
-0.047** 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.067*** 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
2016 
-0.070*** 
(0.016) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
-0.084*** 
(0.016) 
0.033 
(0.018) 
2017 
-0.039* 
(0.018) 
0.37* 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
Constant 0.059 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
0.378 
(0.024) 
0.307 
(0.025) 
Observations 1,870 
630 school 
clusters 
1,875 
631 school 
clusters 
1,874 
630 school 
clusters 
1,868 
630 school 
clusters 
Notes: robust standard errors clustered by school; ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05; 
bandwidth <7 & >-7; Omitted year dummy: 2013.  
 
 
 Table 4.7 reports results on the model using principal turnover, finding evidence 
that classification as needs improvement leads to higher principal turnover two years 
following identification.  
 
Table 4.7 Regression Results, Model C: Principal Turnover 
 Principal 
Turnover 
NeedsImp (2 
years prior) 
.045* 
(.024) 
Index (2 years 
prior) 
-.002 
(.003) 
Index2 (2 years 
prior) 
.000 
(.000) 
NeedsImp x 
Index 
.008 
(.006) 
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 Table 4.7 (continued) 
Focus school -.019 
(.021) 
Enrollment .000 
(.000) 
2015 -.097*** 
(.021) 
2016 .093*** 
(.022) 
2017 -.074*** 
(.022) 
Constant .24 
(.031) 
Observations 725 
 
4.9 Discussion 
These analyses suggest that “report card” accountability as designed in 
Kentucky’s Unbridled Learning system led to actions that increased student mathematics  
achievement at the highest levels of performance and student growth among students at 
the highest quintile of prior performance in mathematics. These results are consistent 
with the expectation that this policy instrument would affect “bottom-up” accountability 
among “principals” such as parents with higher levels of social capital, who may be more 
concerned about increasing performance at the higher tail of the performance distribution. 
The results provide inconsistent evidence toward the expectation that this policy 
instrument could reinforce “top-down” accountability among “principals” such as state 
administrators concerned about improving performance at the lower tail of the 
distribution. They suggest that classification as Needs Improvement increased growth in 
reading among students at the lowest prior quintile of performance, but does not find 
commensurate decreases in novice performance in reading. Prior work such as Hanushek 
108 
 
and Raymond (2005) found no evidence that introduction of state “report card” 
accountability systems – in absence of consequences – led to student learning gains. It is 
likely that the design of Kentucky’s Unbridled Learning accountability system differed 
from those earlier “report card” systems if they reported data in absence of classification 
or judgment, or if earlier versions of classifications gave murky signals.  
In future work, I will estimate a version of Model B with student-level 
observations as the dependent variable, while continuing to estimate heterogeneous 
effects based on students’ prior performance. I will also extend the analysis to the middle 
school level (grades 6-8). This strategy could increase the number of observations within 
the optimal bandwidth, improving the precision of estimates.  
These results also suggest a causal connection between the “report card” aspect of 
Kentucky’s Unbridled Learning accountability system and educator labor markets, in 
increasing turnover of school principals – those “middle managers” who may be most 
affected by both top-town and bottom-up accountability and competing goal priorities. 
Major threats to validity of these results arise due to potential violations of RD 
assumptions. Prior to 2012, schools had very little information they could use to predict 
their accountability score and where that score would fall along the continuum of other 
schools in Kentucky. Beginning with the 2012-13 school year, however, schools had 
more information about their performance relative to that of other schools. As well, KDE 
transitioned to a set cut-off score rather than a percentile-based score, although this score 
shifted from year to year.  While the visual and statistical tests did not uncover evidence 
of manipulation of the assignment variable and although the index scores looked 
continuous, it is possible that this additional information affected school behavior in 
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some way that is unobserved. It could have also affected decisions from the state agency 
regarding data used in the calculation of the accountability index, which could have 
nudged schools over or under the cut-off scores. Finally, the study’s results depend on the 
assumption that assignment to treatment Needs Improvement and control Proficient status 
around the cut-off is as good as random. On this measure, we have mixed evidence. At 
the optimal bandwidth, the difference in mean Free or Reduced Price Lunch rates for 
schools across treatment and control groups is statistically different from zero, but is not 
statistically different from zero at half the optimal bandwidth (+/-3.5).  
4.10 Conclusion 
Reporting information about student outcomes and school-level accountability 
results will likely continue to be a priority for federal and state policy in the U.S., as well 
as other jurisdictions, but states have little information about how these actions influence 
“agents” in the education system such as educators and parents. These results provide 
some initial evidence to suggest that educators, parents, and perhaps even community 
leaders (e.g. United Way organizations, mentoring/tutoring programs) may respond to 
“report card” accountability and target certain areas for improvement. Further research 
into responses to current systems would provide guidance to policymakers in designing 
report cards, as well as “third-party” organizations such as GreatSchools.org that have a 
large market share among parents. 
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CHAPTER 5. LOOKING FORWARD  
5.1 Summary and Policy Implications 
With this research, I have sought to characterize the role of place – the Appalachian 
region in Kentucky, and policy – a suite of standards-based and human capital statewide 
education reforms under the umbrella of Unbridled Learning – on educator labor markets 
in the years following the Great Recession of 2008. Between 2009 and 2018, the 
Appalachian region continued its trajectory of losing population. Its school districts lost 
more than 6,000 students and ended with 1,000 fewer educators teaching in classrooms. 
Adjusted for inflation, teacher salaries in Appalachia decreased at twice the rate of 
salaries for Kentucky teachers outside the region, at similar levels of experience and 
credentials. Analysis of longitudinal student assessment data suggest that at the 
elementary and middle grades, Appalachian school districts have some evidence of 
education productivity as compared to districts outside the region, particularly for the 
lowest-performing students. On average from 2009 to 2018, elementary and middle 
school students in Appalachian districts had significantly lower scores in mathematics 
than students in districts outside Appalachia; their scores in reading, however, were not 
different at conventional levels of statistical significance. Middle school students in 
Appalachian districts, however, made greater gains in reading as compared to outside the 
region. Appalachian students whose prior year scores were in the lowest quintile of 
performance made greater gains in reading and mathematics and at the elementary and 
middle grades levels, as compared to students outside Appalachia with scores in the 
bottom quintile. With the exception of middle grades reading growth, in contrast, 
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Appalachian students whose prior year scores were in the highest quintile made lower 
gains than similar students outside the region. 
Empirical results in Chapter 2 reinforce the notion that Appalachia serves as a 
fixed, isolated labor market in Kentucky and that teacher in Appalachia continue to 
exhibit a strong attachment to place, particularly in terms of patterns of cross-district 
mobility. Appalachian teachers are less likely to move across districts than teachers 
outside of Appalachia. These results hold across other regional designations – with 
multiple LWA’s and educational cooperatives appearing to drive this result. With the 
exception of teachers under the age of 28 who are more likely to leave the profession, 
teachers in Appalachia are less likely to leave teaching in Kentucky school districts as 
compared to teachers outside of Appalachia. Investigation at the level of LWA’s and 
educational coops, however, appears to be heightened in the southern area of Appalachia, 
in the counties north of the Tennessee border, rather than in the more mountainous area 
of Eastern Kentucky. It also differs from conclusions from earlier work (Cowen et al., 
2012). It is possible that changes in economic conditions in this area affected teachers’ 
occupational alternatives (Streams et al., 2013). These results build on this earlier work 
by including an organizational measure, a survey of teacher working conditions – that 
shows an association between positive ratings on the survey and propensity for teachers 
to stay in place. The results also suggest that there is something about Appalachia beyond 
a simple notion of “rural” – with teachers in “rural fringe” and “rural distant” districts 
more likely to cross districts and leave the profession, all other variables held constant. 
More conceptual and empirical work needs to be done to adequately characterize the 
association with student achievement and growth. 
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In Chapter 3, I characterize ways that certified educator staffing changed between 
2009 and 2018 and how educator career pathways diverge across Appalachian and non-
Appalachian districts in Kentucky. In the wake of the Great Recession, Kentucky school 
districts added more school-level positions for certified educators such as instructional 
consultants and deans of students, even in Appalachian school districts that faced 
substantial losses of classroom teacher positions, school-based specialists such as 
librarians and counselors, and district staff. Nevertheless, districts outside Appalachia 
increased these positions at more than twice the rate as districts in Appalachia. It is not 
clear what drove this increase in school-based positions. It could be demand from 
teachers for additional opportunities for career advancement, as a response to policy 
changes at the state or even district level, or in response to federal funding incentives. 
Investigation of a sample of teachers who could be matched to their educator preparation 
program and to their high school further reinforce the notion of Appalachia as a distinct 
educator labor market, with a dominant pattern of high school graduates from Appalachia 
attending educator preparation programs in Appalachia and taking teaching positions in 
Appalachian school districts. Looking at educator career pathways across time, it is clear 
that teachers in Appalachia have had less opportunity for career advancement, which has 
been tied to job satisfaction. It is possible that lower “extrinsic” rewards such as these 
opportunities is compensatory with more “intrinsic” rewards stemming from Appalachian 
teachers’ attachment to place.  
Earlier work from Cowen et al. (2012) elevated the possible policy implication that 
if Appalachian teachers are more likely to stay in place, that efforts to increase education 
productivity may need to focus more on professional learning than on efforts to alter the 
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education workforce through recruitment and retention efforts, which has been a priority 
in larger city school districts across the nation. The analyses in Chapter 3 may suggest 
that with lower opportunities for professional advancement for teachers, but with 
potentially higher needs for professional learning, Appalachian school districts may find 
promise in exploring innovative career progressions for educators. For example, the 
Kentucky Valley Educational Cooperative has focused part of its federal Race to the Top 
District grant on building a system of micro-credentials for teachers to certify completion 
of professional learning.  
In Chapter 4, I find evidence to suggest that organizational report cards with 
publicly reported information designed to send a clear signal about a need for 
organizational performance improvement may have causal effects. In the case of 
Kentucky’s Unbridled Learning school accountability system, a school classification of 
“Needs Improvement” that was reported on school report cards but otherwise came with 
no other consequences appears to have influenced increases in student learning in 
mathematics among higher-performing students. In addition to the empirical research, in 
Chapter 4, I refine earlier conceptual frameworks about organizational report cards 
(Gormley & Weimer, 1999), in which I outline how principals – differentiated by those 
with top-down accountability authority or bottom-up influence – can affect outcomes 
through agents. In this case, the primary agent at work is the school principal. That 
Kentucky’s accountability system seems to have affected principal turnover provides 
some evidence for this framework, and that the strongest effects accrued to higher-
performance in mathematics suggests that bottom-up accountability mechanisms may 
have greater strength in a report card accountability context. It is possible that the signal 
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that a school needs to improve was more likely to be seen by parents with higher access 
to information and social capital, or that school principals perceived that this would be 
the case, so improvement strategies had greater impacts on previously higher-performing 
students. 
Across the nation, statewide education policy has taken a sharp turn away from 
consequential accountability systems with a heavy focus on improving performance 
among at the bottom of the performance distribution, with a commensurate rise in the 
profile of report card accountability. If this type of accountability can influence education 
productivity, but is more likely to do so for students at the higher end of the performance 
distribution, policy actors with interest in improving outcomes among the lowest-
performing students may need to consider if – and if so, how – mechanisms for bottom-
up accountability can accrue benefits to those students.  
The conceptual and empirical work in Chapter 4 also matters for those designing 
place-based education policies, which often run in parallel with “collective action” 
systems of performance improvement. These replace “top-down” monitoring of 
organizational performance with horizontal monitoring across organizations at the level 
of place (e.g. neighborhood, region), or with public reporting about performance at the 
level of place. For example, the Berea College Promise Neighborhood program engages 
in collective action accountability for kindergarten readiness scores across elementary 
schools (and their feeder Head Start and preschool programs) in the Promise 
Neighborhood. These systems also allow for goals to vary at the level of place rather than 
requiring standardization of goals across a set jurisdiction such as state or school district. 
For example, the Promise Neighborhood program in Appalachia has also focused on 
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increasing postsecondary enrollment among high school graduates, given historically 
lower rates of postsecondary completion in the region, but this indicator was not a part of 
the Unbridled Learning accountability index scores for Kentucky high schools.  
5.2 Research Direction 
In future iterations with additional years of data, I plan to extend and refine these 
analyses in several ways to better understand the associations between place and educator 
labor markets. I plan to extend the mobility analysis to estimate the association between 
Appalachian and rural places and inter-district mobility across schools within districts, 
using a wide array of school-level information and tying teachers more closely to student 
achievement and growth, and using a competing risks hazard model for intra- and inter-
district mobility. I will also analyze movement to and from Appalachia separately for 
districts on the border of the region. To better understand the factors associated with 
attrition from the profession, particularly in the wake of economic crisis and the myriad 
challenges faced by students and families in the Appalachian region, I hope to extend the 
analysis by considering educators’ career alternatives as in Streams et al. (2013) as well 
as a richer array of student and community covariates. Finally, I hope to increase the 
match rate between educators, their educator preparation institution, and high school data 
to better understand initial placement decisions, as well as first- or second-year moves, in 
the context of the teacher-school matching literature.  
A second area of emphasis following this research, following (Combs et al., 2018; 
Streams et al., 2011) and utilizing the CWI and CWIFT, will be to better understand the 
changes in school finance that affected the Appalachian region in Kentucky, and 
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particularly affected teacher salaries and staffing trends, in the wake of the Great 
Recession. 
Finally, as suggested by Chapter 4, I have continue to explore how various 
principals interested in improving an outcome – whether it be in education, health, 
environment/climate, or another arena – use information to support top-down monitoring 
mechanisms or bottom-up mobilization to influence agents’ priorities and actions. My 
hope is for more scholarship that illuminates how – and for whom – these mechanisms 
work or fall short of their intended purpose.  
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